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Abstract: 
 
Throughout the Second World War, over 150,000 men were compelled to arms under 
Canada's National Resources Mobilization Act, but these men could not be sent overseas 
unless they volunteered for front-line service. Their status as conscripts led many 
contemporaries to construct them as disloyal and unpatriotic foreigners because they were 
not willing to subscribe to ideas surrounding patriotism and voluntarism. These constructions 
speak to the profound disquiet that the conscription issue triggered for the nation.  
This thesis explores contemporary ideas about conscripts, as well as the perspectives 
of compulsory recruits themselves, to argue that Canadians were unsettled by waning British 
imperialism, emerging ideas interconnected with the rise of the welfare state, and the 
country's lack of its own sense of self. These conclusions provide a more nuanced 
understanding of conscription and identity outside of the high-level political approach that 
dominates the historiography. 
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Introduction: 
"The story of the 'Zombies' who stayed at home" 
 
The climax of Canada's Second World War conscription crisis came in November 
1944, when Prime Minister William Lyon Mackenzie King ordered 16,000 home defence 
conscripts overseas.1 From the outset of the war, the Prime Minister demonstrated a keen 
commitment to handle the conscription issue more delicately than had been the case during 
the Great War, promising that his administration would not conscript men for service 
abroad.2 However, owing to rapid German advances in Europe, the government soon 
escalated the country's wartime commitments by enacting the National Resources 
Mobilization Act (NRMA), which established compulsory military service. Those compelled 
under its powers served in defensive roles in Canada, enabling substantive numbers of 
voluntary recruits to mobilize for the front lines. King repeated his assurances that he would 
not compel men overseas, but by 1944, the situation had again changed. The Canadian Army 
reported shortages of trained infantrymen, and despite the Department of National Defence's 
best efforts to bolster voluntary enlistments, King announced that several thousand NRMA 
recruits would soon serve on the front lines, pointing to the April 1942 plebiscite that 
released his government from earlier pledges. To the surprise of many, the first large 
demonstrations against conscription came not in Quebec, but in British Columbia, and not 
from French Canadians, but from English-speaking home defence troops stationed at 
Vernon.3 Reports of the large scale of that demonstration sparked half-a-dozen further anti-
                                                 
1 Peter A. Russell, "BC's 1944 'Zombie' Protests against Overseas Conscription," BC Studies no. 122 
(Summer 1999): 49. 
2 Brereton Greenhous and W.A.B. Douglas, Out of the Shadows: Canada in the Second World War 
(Toronto: Dundurn Press, 1996): 252. 
3 Russell, "BC's 1944 'Zombie' Protests": 49. 
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conscription protests at Chilliwack, Courtenay, Port Alberni, Nanaimo, Prince George, and 
Terrace.4 
Figure 1: 
"Down with Conscription" 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Troops at Terrace make their feelings against conscription known during the 25 November 1944 parade. 
LAC, RG 24, Vol. 2654, HQS-35-45, File 5, Image C-140121. 
 
Across the province, the most common response among conscripts was to assemble 
within the confines of their respective military camp and to march through the nearest town 
to protest the recent order-in-council. In some locations, demonstrations deteriorated into 
drunken brawls pitting the recruits against military and civilian police, while elsewhere, the 
destruction of property was all too common.5 At Terrace, events escalated quickly to become 
                                                 
4 Ibid.  
5 Library and Archives Canada (hereafter LAC), Record Group (hereafter RG) 24, Volume 2655, 
HQS-35-45, File 7, "Court of Inquiry – Unauthorized assembly of troops in the Vernon area," 27 November 
1944: 2; Volume 2655, HQS-35-45, File 6, "Proceedings of a Court of Inquiry assembled at A6 C.E.T.C., 
Chilliwack, BC," Appendix B, 5 December 1944; Volume 2655, HQS-35-45, File 7, "Court of Inquiry – 
Disturbances Prince George BC," 14 December 1944: 2; and Volume 2655, HQS-35-45, File 6, Major General 
G.R. Pearkes to Secretary DND, "NRMA Demonstrations," 5 December 1944: 3. In Vernon, one intoxicated 
officer insulted the troops as they marched past, and was subsequently assaulted, while in Chilliwack, inebriated 
demonstrators engaged in fisticuffs with police. In Prince George, troops burned a Canadian Red Ensign during 
their demonstration, while recruits in Courtenay smashed a window of the local Canadian Legion hut because of 
the organization's pro-conscription stance. 
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an outright mutiny, characterized by one military historian as "the largest-scale mutiny over 
the longest period of time ever to occur in the Canadian Army."6 There, members of Les 
Fusiliers du Saint-Laurent, one of four units stationed at the Terrace Military Camp, first 
engaged in disobedient behaviour in refusing to turn out on parade.7 Later that evening, the 
troops ransacked the unit's armory, pilfering some 50,000 rounds of rifle ammunition, 13,000 
rounds of submachine gun ammunition, and four boxes of grenades.8 By the following day, 
news of Les Fusiliers' refusal to parade spread rapidly throughout the camp, along with the 
armaments they procured, which were soon distributed among men of the other units. Over 
the course of the next week, discipline had broken down completely and control of the camp 
was firmly in the hands of the NRMA recruits. Events intensified further when troops 
marched through the town of Terrace armed with rifles, all the while carrying banners 
inscribed with "Down with Conscription" and "Zombies Strike Back" (Figures 1 and 2). For 
much of the war, home defence troops were known pejoratively as 'Zombies' because they 
supposedly lacked the intelligence and will to serve overseas, and while the term was 
intended to be an insult, the demonstrators took it up as something of a badge.9 Insurgent 
troops also halted military vehicles and attempted to commandeer a speeding train as 
rumours abounded that troops had mounted anti-tank guns in their lines.10 It seemed as 
though little could be done to quell what could "only be considered as mutiny."11 Eventually, 
                                                 
6 Reginald H. Roy, "From the Darker Side of Canadian Military History: Mutiny in the Mountains – 
the Terrace Incident," Canadian Defence Quarterly 6, no. 2 (Autumn 1976): 53. 
7 Russell, "BC's 1944 'Zombie' Protests": 49. 
8 LAC, RG 24, Volume 2654, HQS-35-45, File 5, "Proceedings of a Court of Inquiry Assembled at 
Terrace, BC," 3 December 1944: 2, 11, and 14. 
9 Russell, "BC's 1944 'Zombie' Protests": 52 note 10. In addition to the "Zombies Strike Back," 
inscription, other slogans used by demonstrators included "Hurrah for Zombies" and "We'll Be Zombies 
Forever." 
10 Directorate of History, File 746.009 (D8), "Prince Albert Volunteers, Reports on Disturbances," 20 
December 1944, quoted in Roy, "From the Darker Side": 51. 
11 LAC, Manuscript Group (hereafter MG) 26, J-13, W.L.M. King, "The Diaries of Prime Minister 
William Lyon Mackenzie King," 28 November 1944: 8. 
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however, the camp's senior officer, noticeably absent to this point, returned to Terrace from 
Vancouver and immediately made plans to restore discipline. He halted the men's pay until 
further notice, ensured that all troops were aware of Section 7 of the Army Act informing 
them of the consequences for mutiny, and ordered all parades to resume within the men's 
huts, rather than in the more public spaces of the drill hall or parade grounds.12 In the 
demonstration's aftermath, few recruits were charged with participating in mutiny or were 
punished for their actions. Instead, many received orders to embark for overseas service. 
Figure 2: 
"Zombies Strike Back" 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Demonstrators at Terrace can be seen taking back the 'Zombie' label. As this photo demonstrates, the 
recruits carried their weapons during their parade through the streets of Terrace. 
LAC, RG 24, Vol. 2654, HQS-35-45, File 5, Image C-140122. 
                                                 
12 "Proceedings of a Court of Inquiry Assembled at Terrace," Exhibit N, 28 November 1944.  
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 British Columbia's anti-conscription demonstrations of 1944, and especially the 
mutiny at Terrace, were the intellectual genesis for this thesis. The latter incident is relatively 
well-documented, if anecdotally, in popular histories such as Nadine Asante's The History of 
Terrace, Floyd Frank's My Valley's Yesteryears, and the Terrace Regional Historical 
Society's 20th Century Anecdotes from the Terrace Area.13 In addition, two scholarly articles 
shed light on events at Terrace. Reginald H. Roy narrated the mutiny in "From the Darker 
Side of Canadian Military History: Mutiny in the Mountains – the Terrace Incident," set 
within a timeframe beginning in 1942 with the arrival of troops in Terrace. He also detailed 
the campaign to 'convert' home-defence oriented conscripts into volunteers willing to serve 
on the front lines, as well as the officer corps' perceptions of the quality and morale of 
conscripted troops.14 Although his treatment is interpretively timid, Roy notes that some 
officers were inclined to dismiss their troops as being "of mediocre quality," because they 
believed their men to be "of Central European descent."15 In narrating the mutiny, Roy 
concludes that its "origins were political, not military, in nature."16 On the other hand, 
historian, Peter A. Russell, examined how military officers responded to the demonstrations 
at Vernon and Terrace respectively in "BC's 1944 'Zombie' Protests against Overseas 
Conscription." He contends that, in both instances, senior officers "commonly resorted to 
ethnic characterizations linked to the issue of loyalty," to explain the conscripts' resistance to 
                                                 
13 Nadine Asante, The History of Terrace (Terrace, BC: Totem Press, 1972): 164-70; Floyd Frank, My 
Valley's Yesteryears (Victoria: Orca Book Publishers Ltd., 1991): 121-29; and Terrace Regional Historical 
Society, 20th Century Anecdotes from the Terrace Area (Terrace: Totem Press Ltd., 2002): 31-43. Also see: 
Karen Keuchle, "The Terrace Mutiny" (Unpublished Manuscript, District of Terrace, 1984); Mark Bourrie, The 
Fog of War: Censorship of Canada's Media in World War Two (Vancouver: Douglas & McIntyre, 2011): 234-
55, and Daniel German, "Press Censorship and the Terrace Mutiny: A Case Study in Second World War 
Information Management," Journal of Canadian Studies 31, no. 4 (Winter 1996): 124-142. 
14 Roy, "From the Darker Side": 43-45. 
15 Ibid: 45. 
16 Ibid: 53. 
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service overseas.17 In Vernon, officers evidently believed their men to be British, and 
therefore loyal, and downplayed the severity of the demonstrations there. In Terrace, 
however, Russell argues that: 
high command uncritically passed on to its superiors the most exaggerated rumours of 
an armed mutiny. The explanation for the difference between the senior officers' 
actions probably lay in their perceptions of the troops' ethnic origins and these troops' 
earlier behaviour…The home defence soldiers at Terrace were assumed to be French 
Canadians or Central Europeans. Resistance there confirmed the officers' prejudices 
concerning who was and who was not loyal.18 
 
These interpretations rooted in ethnicity stand out in the scholarly treatment as a convenient, 
if too simple an explanation, for the widespread disobedience in November 1944.  
A variety of primary sources related to the demonstrations – such as war diaries, 
courts of inquiry, military reports, news stories, and other correspondence – made it obvious 
that ethnic characterizations were not the only means by which civilian Canadians and 
military commanders attempted to understand the conscripts. While the nation was, indeed, 
under the impression that most NRMA personnel were French Canadians or Central 
Europeans, the conscripts were also constructed as being 'non-British' in attitude and outlook, 
uneducated about democracy, foreign to other Anglo-Canadian ideas and values, and 
otherwise lacking in the outlook of  'right-thinking' Canadians. That these images existed and 
were not strictly speaking consistent or entirely compelling hinted at the value of an amended 
inquiry centred on Canadian ideas about conscription, the substance of the 'Zombie' 
conscript's imagined characteristics, and the NRMA recruits' sense of themselves. In effect, 
the provincial anti-conscription demonstrations provided a platform centred on a different 
and, in its realization, a deeper inquiry.  
                                                 
17 Russell, "BC's 1944 'Zombie' Protests": 71. 
18 Ibid: 49. 
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The present study thus explores how the nation discussed and represented the 
'Zombie' conscripts in the general public, in military circles, and among the recruits 
themselves. To what degree did the conscript factor into the wartime mentalité of Canadians, 
and how sensitive was that worldview to real and imagined differences between compulsory 
and voluntary recruits? Why did the overseas participation of NRMA recruits matter so 
deeply to civilians and the military? Why did Canadians construct NRMA personnel in such 
anxious and condemnatory terms? And perhaps most importantly, what do these depictions 
of conscripts reveal about Canada's national identity and sense of self? Despite the attention 
paid to conscription within the framework of the nation's wartime experiences in the first half 
of the twentieth century, historians have not yet pursued these questions. Further, in 
exploring the social construction of conscription during the Second World War, the present 
study also illuminates the perspectives and experiences of those who were compelled to 
serve. Quite simply, why did conscripts refuse to serve overseas? Did they see themselves as 
standing apart from their compatriots in opinion and outlook? Were ethnic minorities, in fact, 
overrepresented in the ranks of the NRMA? How did they conceive of their responsibilities 
to the state, and what was their definition of civic duty? Finally, what does the conscript 
perspective reveal about Canada in the 1940s? The historical record relating to conscription 
is rife with intriguing possibilities for (re)interpretation.  
It became apparent, in attempting to ground these new directions in the 
historiography, that historians of conscription in Canada have employed a top-down 
approach to the topic. In part, the clamor over conscription in the Great War established a 
legacy against which scholars have viewed compulsory service in the Second World War. 
Broadly, the conscription crisis of 1917 has been told through the lens of politics and 
especially the split within Wilfrid Laurier's Liberal Party and the orchestration of Sir Robert 
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Borden's pro-conscription Unionist government.19 As a result, when historians turned to the 
Second World War, they seemed to assume that the subject was one of high-level politics. 
Rather than view the 1939-45 conflict in its own light, the historiography merely defaulted to 
the Great War approach. Of course, the problem therein is that two decades had passed, and 
in the intervening years, the nation had changed as Canadians explored novel ideas about the 
public's relationship to the government and the nation's identity and sense of self within the 
broader Empire. 
While historians acknowledge that Canadian opinion on conscription during the 
Second World War was neither ubiquitous nor fixed, the dominant approach has been to 
employ a perspective centred on the highest level of government, or alternatively, to compare 
and contrast conscription policy in the two world wars. Further, historians' reliance on Prime 
Minister King's public and private records along with those of his Cabinet colleagues has 
underpinned a particular construction of wartime events when examining the politics of 
conscription.20 Yet, outside of Parliament, everyday Canadians engaged in visceral 
discussions about compulsory service and struggled to make sense of the NRMA men. For 
many, the conscripts remained an enigma. Having withstood pressure to enlist as front-line 
volunteers willing to make the ultimate sacrifice, their status whispered of uncertain loyalties. 
Ultimately, they were a source of profound unease. Under the NRMA, over 157,000 men 
were compelled to undergo training or serve in home defensive roles, a figure that represents 
                                                 
19 For example, see: John W. Dafoe, Laurier: A Study in Canadian Politics (Toronto: Thomas Allen, 
1922); A.M. Willms, "Conscription 1917: A Brief for the Defence," University of Toronto Press Journals 37, 
no. 4 (December 1956): 338-51; W.R. Graham, Arthur Meighen: The Door of Opportunity (Toronto: Clarke, 
Irwin, and Co., 1960); Desmond Morton, "French Canada and War, 1868-1917: the Military Background the 
Conscription Crisis of 1917," in War and Society in North America, edited by J.L. Granatstein and R.D. Cuff 
(Toronto: T. Nelson,1971): 84-103; Elizabeth Armstrong, The Crisis of Quebec, 1914-1918 (Montreal-
Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1974); and J.L. Granatstein and J.M. Hitsman, Broken Promises: A 
History of Conscription in Canada (Toronto: University of Oxford Press, 1977). 
20 Daniel Byers, Zombie Army: The Canadian Army and Conscription in the Second World War 
(Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 2016): 3. 
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15 per cent of Canada's armed forces during the Second World War.21 Nearly 60,000 NRMA 
recruits went on to volunteer for overseas service, representing 10 per cent of all volunteers 
during the conflict. Another 60,000 served on defence posts across the country, releasing an 
equal number of volunteers to proceed overseas.22 Given these figures, it is not surprising 
that the conscripted men received such close attention from their Canadian compatriots, their 
colleagues in uniform, and their officers. However, few studies have considered the 
development of ideas and attitudes towards conscription during the war, or the experiences of 
the NRMA recruits themselves.  
In the aftermath of the Second World War, historians immediately set out to assess 
Canada's role in the conflict. The country mobilized one out of every 11 citizens, and the task 
of describing the enormous sacrifices and accomplishments of the Canadian people fell to the 
service of the Army's official historians.23 The proximity of writers to events, and the fact 
that many of these historians served in the war in some capacity, meant that these early 
portraits function better as primary sources rather than scholarly treatments. Indeed, owing to 
authorial inclinations and postwar retrenchments, these contemporary works tended to 
emphasize overseas efforts and the theatres of war rather than the home-front peculiarities.24 
For example, C.P. Stacey's The Canadians in Britain, Joseph Schull's The Far Distant Ships: 
An Official Account of Canadian Naval Operations in the Second World War, and G.W. 
Nicholson's The Official History of the Canadian Army in the Second World War, all detailed 
the heroic efforts of Canadians on the battlefield while offering only cursory glances to 
                                                 
21 C.P. Stacey, Arms, Men and Governments: The War Policies of Canada, 1939-1945 (Ottawa: 
Queen's Printer, 1970): 599-601. 
22 Byers, Zombie Army: 3. 
23 Tim Cook, Clio's Warriors: Canadian Historians and the Writing of the World Wars (Vancouver: 
University of British Columbia Press, 2006): 130. 
24 Ibid.  
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events at home.25 Theirs was a perspective of the war as something that had occurred in 
distant lands.  
The next generation of Canadian scholars sought to redress this imbalance and turned 
their gaze to the Canadian home front. Beginning with Bruce Hutchison's biography of Prime 
Minister King, domestic politics of the Second World War assumed a rising profile. As a 
well-known journalist and parliamentary reporter, Hutchison witnessed many key events in 
Ottawa firsthand and drew upon conversations with important participants in his account of 
King as Canada's war leader.26 In addition to his own recollections, Hutchison relied on the 
Prime Minister's personal diaries to sketch a vivid portrait of his career through the 
Depression and Second World War. His work, Mackenzie King: The Incredible Canadian, 
was perhaps the first book to include a discussion, however brief, of conscription, and in so 
doing, he highlighted King's perspective on issues of manpower and military reinforcements. 
Of particular interest is Hutchison's emphasis on King's belief that he was "betrayed by the 
military mind," when his military advisors threatened to resign over the conscription issue, 
thus forcing him to compel troops overseas in November 1944.27 Hutchison's sympathetic 
portrayal of the man who led the nation through a successful prosecution of the war set the 
stage for historians to consider the conscription issue, and his treatment of the subject 
                                                 
25 C.P. Stacey, The Canadians in Britain , 1939-1944 (Ottawa: King's Printer, 1945); Joseph Schull, 
The Far Distant Ships: An Official Account of Canadian Naval Operations in the Second World War (Ottawa: 
Queen's Printer, 1950); and G.W. Nicholson, The Official History of the Canadian Army in the Second World 
War (Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1956). Stacey's work includes: Canada's Battle in Normandy: The Canadian 
Army's Share in the Operations (Ottawa: King's Printer, 1946); The Canadian Army, 1939-1945: An Official 
Historical Summary (Ottawa: King's Printer, 1948); From Pachino to Ortona: The Canadian Campaign in 
Sicily and Italy, 1943 (Ottawa: King's Printer, 1946); and Official History of the Canadian Army in the Second 
World War (Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1955). Although no one was as prolific a writer as was Stacey, other 
examples include G.N. Tucker's The Naval Service of Canada: Its Official History (Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 
1952) and the Historical Section's series on The R.C.A.F. Overseas (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1944). 
26 Daniel Byers, "Mobilizing Canada: The National Resources Mobilization Act, the Department of 
National Defence, and Compulsory Military Service in Canada, 1940-1945" (PhD Dissertation, McGill 
University, 2000): 3. 
27 Bruce Hutchison, Mackenzie King: The Incredible Canadian (Toronto: Longmans, Green and Co., 
1953): 345.  
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sparked a debate among historians seemingly intent on placing blame for the conscription 
crisis of 1944.28 
In response to the descriptions of the 'generals' revolt' alleged in Hutchison's work, 
several authors quickly emphasized the involvement of political and military actors involved 
in the conscription crisis, rather than the wider effects of conscription on the country. 
Historian and political economist R. MacGregor Dawson, for example, began interviewing 
key cabinet ministers and army officers to draft what would become The Conscription Crisis 
of 1944.29 Dawson quickly dismissed the notion of a military coup, although his account 
remained critical of senior army commanders for openly supporting compulsory measures, 
and with that, privileging front-line reinforcements over national unity, an action that 
apparently offended Dawson's strict and liberal notions of civil-military relations.30 
Coincident with Dawson's interviews, E.L.M. Burns published Manpower in the Canadian 
Army in which he offered a re-examination of "how the Canadian Army used the manpower 
at its disposal during the second [sic] World War."31 As a former military officer, Burns 
possessed firsthand knowledge of the challenges associated with allocating resources, and he 
thus questioned how the army's management of manpower may have contributed to the 1944 
political crisis. Yet despite this inquiry, Burns forthrightly assigned blame: "manpower 
problems arise when the government does not assume the power to compel each man to serve 
                                                 
28 A.R.M. Lower was the first to respond to the controversial 'general's revolt' in his book review of 
Hutchison's biography. See: A.R.M. Lower, "The Incredible Canadian," Queen's Quarterly 59 (Winter 1952-
53): 562. 
29 Dawson's personal notes and interviews can be found in LAC, MG 26, J-17, Volume 6, "Memoirs 
Project: Notes and Interviews on Conscription Crisis 1944 by Macgreor [sic] Dawson." 
30 See: R. MacGregor Dawson, The Conscription Crisis of 1944 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 
1961): 85-86 and 104-05. Dawson passed away before completing his monograph, resulting in a one-sided 
account that often lacks nuances. For a discussion of Dawson's views, and his passing, see: Stacey, Arms, Men 
and Governments: 451 and Byers, Zombie Army: 4. 
31 E.L.M. Burns, Manpower in the Canadian Army 1939-1945 (Toronto: Clarke, Irwin & Company, 
1956): 7.  
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where he is most needed."32 Ralph Allen, a journalist and former war correspondent, also 
took up the debate on complicity and responsibility. To a far greater degree than other writers 
of the era, Allen appreciated the implications of conscription for the men compelled to serve 
under the NRMA and describes in great detail the frictions existing between volunteers and 
conscripts within the army.33 He was also more even-handed in his discussion of the crisis 
and notes that the tensions surrounding conscription were the product of both government 
and military mismanagement. To that end, the former "was committed to two propositions, 
each the exact opposite of the other… Canada could not wait for the war to reach its shores, 
but must send men abroad to intercept it [and] No man should be sent abroad unless he 
wanted to go," while senior military officers further aggravated the situation by allowing 
discrimination and harassment in their units even though it contravened official policy.34 The 
intrigue of political games and skullduggery combined with competition among scholars 
helped to explain why the historical treatment centred on politics and complicity. 
Conscription became an increasingly prominent topic of inquiry in the three decades 
following the end of the war and, as a later study identified, the period produced a 
consolidation of historical writing.35 Perhaps the most thorough overview of the Canadian 
Army in the Second World War at home and overseas appeared in Stacey's Arms, Men and 
Governments: The War Policies of Canada, 1939-1945. Having served as an official 
Canadian historian since the war's end, Stacey turned his attention to the war effort at home. 
Yet, his impressive overview of compulsory service remained one aligned with the army. 
                                                 
32 Ibid: 5. 
33 As a war correspondent, Allen witnessed the discriminatory treatment of conscripts and eventually 
penned two novels that detailed the pressures on conscripts to volunteer for the front lines. See: Ralph Allen, 
Home Made Banners (Toronto: Longmans, Green and Co., 1946): 38-75 and The High White Forest (Garden 
City, NY: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1964): 170-94. 
34 Ralph Allen, Ordeal by Fire: Canada, 1910-1945 (Toronto: Doubleday Canada Limited, 1961): 393-
94. 
35 Byers, "Mobilizing Canada": 8.  
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Stacey's chapter on conscription synthesized the problems the military faced in administering 
compulsory service as well as the war overseas while, at the same time, criticized King and 
his Cabinet-level mismanagement.36 Ultimately, his argument on conscription was threefold. 
The causes of the conscription crisis were almost wholly political; senior army commanders 
provided proper and constitutional advice to the Cabinet concerning the dire need for 
reinforcements overseas; and that King imagined a 'revolt of the generals' as a justification of 
his about-turn on conscription.37 Like much writing of the era that emphasized the political 
aspects of conscription, Stacey dedicated little attention to the effects of conscription policy 
on those to whom it applied or to popular impressions from average Canadians.  
J.L. Granatstein, Stacey's colleague in the historical section at Ottawa and fellow 
former Army officer, began his own research on conscription. Granatstein's interest in the 
issue eventually spanned his career and his first foray came in the form of Conscription in the 
Second World War: A Study in Political Management. Through a chronological narrative of 
events, Granatstein compared Prime Minister Borden's mishandling of the conscription issue 
in 1917 with the 1942 and 1944 crises and, in so doing, emphasized King's role. Specifically, 
he argued that "the political gifts and compromising skills of Prime Minister Mackenzie 
King, a politician of extraordinary receptivity to the moods of Quebec, held the fabric of 
national unity together," despite it being "a task of enormous difficulty."38 According to 
Granatstein, that "there can be no doubt that the conscription crises of the Second World War 
                                                 
36 Stacey, Arms, Men and Governments: 428, 431, 447, 459-75, and 481-82. 
37 Ibid: 470. 
38 J.L. Granatstein, Conscription in the Second World War: A Study in Political Management (Toronto: 
The Ryerson Press, 1969): viii. 
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were not as damaging" as had been the case during the conscription crisis of the Great War, 
was largely attributable to King's efforts.39 
 Granatstein expanded these arguments in Broken Promises: A History of Conscription 
in Canada, a book co-authored with another former army historian, J.M. Hitsman. They 
begin their history with an examination of compulsory military service in New France and 
concluded with the Cold War debates over conscription. This broad chronological scope 
produced only a cursory survey of the issues, although conscription during the Second World 
War remained a primary concern. Thus, the authors offer a more thorough and detailed 
account of the 1939-45 conflict than they do of any other period in Canadian history. Their 
study centred on why conscription was such a potent weapon in the hands of politicians, 
whether conscription was ever a political necessity, and why King's handling of the issue was 
so successful.40 While arguing that, "No single issue has divided Canadians so sharply as 
conscription for overseas military service in time of war," Granatstein and Hitsman 
nonetheless downplayed the severity of the crisis while presenting King's actions in a 
favourable light and criticizing the military for building up enormous forces that could only 
be reinforced through a resort to conscription.41 Their treatment also moved beyond the 
Cabinet by discussing the machinery used to mobilize civilian and military manpower and 
briefly assessing public opinion on the issue. Despite these efforts and consistent with the 
patterns established in the early 1950s, the book never grapples with the conscripts' lived 
experiences.  
Other historians continued to rely on this top-down interpretive approach common 
among the postwar generation. Perhaps the most notable of these was Reginald H. Roy, who 
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began his work on the Canadian Army in Canada after having previously published 
regimental histories and several accounts of the Canadians at battle.42 A Second World War 
veteran-come-historian, Roy provided the first accounts of conscription outside of the 
nation's capital, and in turning his attention to the effects of the conscription crisis in British 
Columbia, he primarily focused on the career of Major-General George R. Pearkes, a 
Victoria Cross recipient and the General Officer Commanding-in-Chief of Pacific 
Command.43 While Roy ultimately rejects the 'revolt of the generals' introduced by 
Hutchison in the late 1940s, he was consistent with the earlier generation of militarily-trained 
writers in that he openly sided with Pearkes and his role in administering the conscripts and 
advising the Minister of National Defence. In his own words, Roy wanted: 
to show something of the background to the events leading up to the conscription 
crisis of 1944 west of the Rocky Mountains. One of the central figures in that crisis, 
and one whose name has frequently been connected with the so-called 'Revolt of the 
Generals', was Major-General G.R. Pearkes. He is frequently depicted in a number of 
books and articles as the prime mover in an attempt to undermine government policy 
with respect to both conversion and conscription… The record shows that this was not 
true. No man worked harder or more consistently to bring about the results the 
government desired.44 
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44 Reginald H. Roy, "Major-General G.R. Pearkes and the Conscription Crisis in British Columbia, 
1944," BC Studies 28 (Winter 1975-76): 72. 
16 
 
He thus openly sided with Pearkes and his role in administering the conscripts and advising 
the Minister of National Defence. At the same time, Roy moved the interpretive line on the 
crisis by attacking the notion of a conspiracy of military officers, and shifted his gaze toward 
military leadership closer to the ground. His article on the Terrace mutiny also represents the 
first attempt to examine conscription outside of Parliament, providing a new lens through 
which to view events. Despite this new angle, however, Roy continued to emphasize the 
high-level political aspect of conscription during the Second World War.45  
 By the late 1960s and into the 1970s, many Canadian historians turned to social 
history, and the dominant political and martial interpretation of conscription did not garner 
much attention. The failure of social historians to see the conscripts as everyday working 
Canadians – who at that time were attracting so much scholarly attention – is an intriguing 
oversight. In their haste to abandon military and political history in favor of history 'from the 
bottom up,' these social historians neglected to see the average soldier as a working person 
manipulated by the larger social, economic, political, and military superstructure. That they 
would do this in the era of Vietnam and the civil rights movements in Canada and the United 
States is ironic. Until the late 1990s, Canadian historians demonstrated little interest in 
revisiting compulsory military service, and the few exceptions tended to reiterate the earlier 
conclusions and perspectives.46 While some credit the thoroughness of earlier accounts and 
the broad shift away from political history as being responsible for this waning interest, the 
                                                 
45 Roy, "From the Darker Side": 53.  
46 For example, see: Reginald H. Roy, "Morale in the Canadian Army in Canada," Canadian Defence 
Quarterly 16 (Autumn 1986): 40-45; and J.L. Rea, "What Really Happened? A New Look at the Conscription 
Crisis," The Beaver 74, no. 2 (April/May 1994): 10-19. These articles represent a degree of forward movement 
in the historiography on conscription, but ultimately they remain true to the broader trends identified here. The 
former article examines morale in the Canadian Army – a commendable topic that sheds further light away from 
Ottawa – but the author's sympathetic views towards the military cannot be ignored. Despite its title, the latter 
article only offers a new look insofar as it examines Prime Minister King's Cabinet colleagues and their various 
stances on conscription, rather than simply pitting King against the Canadian Army and its General Staff.  Its 
focus remains one of high-level politics. 
17 
 
trend had more to do with an interpretive blindness and a deference to the accepted 
politicized version of events that discouraged social historians from re-examining the topic.47   
More recently – and perhaps influenced by several decades of social historical 
research – scholars returned to military and political history with fresh eyes and new 
questions. Changing trends in historical writing have led to a reinterpretation of war itself, 
and this new war-and-society historiography is frequently oriented towards investigating the 
place of the military within society, considering how wars shape societies more broadly, and 
writing the history of battles from the bottom up.48 These efforts shed light on the 
experiences of individuals and groups of soldiers as opposed to more traditional aspects of 
politico-military history such as strategic leadership and decision-making.49 Although 
historians of conscription have been comparatively slow to reinterpret compulsory service, 
this too is beginning to change. 
Indeed, the more recent scholarship on compulsory service represents a new 
interpretive turn. Daniel Thomas Byers' work on the National Resources Mobilization Act is 
the first sustained attempt to "go below the political level to explore the actual role of the 
Canadian army in administering compulsory military training in the Second World War."50 
Byers is especially interested in General H.D.G. Crerar's role in administering the NRMA, 
and argues in Zombie Army: The Canadian Army and Conscription in the Second World War 
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that Crerar and his subordinates allowed many of their personal and professional ambitions to 
shape compulsory military training in Canada.51 More intriguing is Byers' use of "statistical 
records and other sources that have been unknown or ignored until now" to explore "the 
history of all 157,841 men who served as conscripts between 1940 and 1945 – their ethnic, 
linguistic, religious, and occupational backgrounds, their experiences of compulsory training, 
the ways that army officials attempted to convince them to volunteer once they were in 
uniform, and the responses of conscripts themselves to those pressures."52 Many Canadians 
assumed that conscripts were mostly French Canadian, or from other ethnic groups that did 
not share in the dominant Anglo-Canadian society's beliefs, but as Byers shows, "more than 
has been previously realized, these men tended to reflect the makeup of the country as a 
whole."53 By exploring the origins and backgrounds of the conscripts and the effects of 
conscription legislation exerted on their lives, Byers' inquiry into the men called up under the 
NRMA makes Zombie Army a pioneering work in the field.54 
Several new insights into the experience of home defence conscripts have similarly 
expanded our understanding of conscription. In "'My Darlin' Clementine?' Wooing Zombies 
for $6.50 a Night: General Service-NRMA Relations in Wartime Calgary," Dean Oliver, a 
senior historian at the Canadian War Museum, examined a July 1944 disturbance at Calgary's 
Currie Barracks in which 150 troops brandished bayonets after a night of drinking in the 
camp's wet canteen.55 Arguing that contemporary newspaper accounts sensationalized the 
incident, Dean asserts that the disturbance was rooted in the bitter and longstanding divisions 
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between volunteers and conscripts.56 The inference, of course, is that perceptions of NRMA 
recruits had genuine consequences 'on the ground.' Further, Oliver asserts that the Currie 
Barracks disturbance "represent[s] only the tip of the iceberg, a fleeting glimpse at the 
complexities of Canadian military life in the 1940s that cannot be charted on battle maps or 
followed in war diaries."57 The possibilities for a sustained reinterpretation of conscription 
highlighting these complexities are intriguing, and Oliver's work offers a starting point to 
explore that which has escaped attention since the 1940s: what was the reaction to 
conscription outside of Parliament, what were the lived experiences of the conscripts, and 
what might this tell us about Canada in the 1940s? Only by shifting the emphasis away from 
King and his cabinet colleagues can we begin to discern some of the complexities. Viewed in 
concert with Russell's portrait of senior officers' assumptions about the conscripted men and 
their character, Oliver's study lends credence to the argument that the possible meanings and 
identities of being a conscript deserve closer attention. It is this goal, that of rendering a more 
human impression of the conscript identity and the extent to which it resonated with or was 
refracted by average Canadians, that forms the present study's key purpose. 
In order to reinterpret conscription issue from an angle outside of high-level politics, 
a separate body of literature concerned with ideas and representation informs this thesis. R. 
Scott Sheffield, drawing on seminal cultural and ethnic studies such as Edward Said's 
Orientalism and Kay Anderson's Vancouver's Chinatown: Racial Discourse in Canada, 
1875-1980, questions how First Nations people were discussed in public and administrative 
discourse in the twentieth century. In The Red Man's on the Warpath: The Image of the 
"Indian" and the Second World War, Sheffield investigates the complex framework of visual 
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imagery, stereotypes, and assumptions surrounding the country's 'Indian' population in order 
explain the place of First Nations in wartime society.58 He examines "total war's impact on a 
society and culture, viewed through the window of the image of the 'Indian.'"59 The Canadian 
public and administrators for the Indian Affairs Branch constructed a variety of stereotypes 
on which they could draw, including variations such as the 'noble savage,' the 'drunken 
Indian,' the 'Indian-at-war,' and the 'Indian victim.' By examining these representations, 
Sheffield demonstrates "how the threat of defeat or imminent victory, the extremes of war's 
emotional spectrum, seized the collective consciousness of the country," to argue that 
aboriginal people "presented a challenge to Canadians' sense of themselves, revealing the 
fallacy of nationalist mythologies touting tolerance, equality, and democracy."60 In that 
fashion, Sheffield's approach informs the argument found herein that the discourse 
surrounding the nation's conscripts revealed Canadian notions of duty, ideas about 
government, and in a broader sense, national identity.  
Employing Sheffield's work, the present study "presumes that the mental framework 
of knowledge and assumption was designed and created by the dominant society for its own 
consumption and to meet its own requirements," to enable "the members of this society to 
make sense of the world around them [and] to impose meaning and order on chaos."61 To that 
end, Sheffield wonders about the "power, pedigree, and pervasiveness of the idea of the 
'Indian' in English Canada and about how the dominant society imagined, represented, 
defined, and ruled First Nations people in the twentieth century." 62 Rather than illuminating 
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indigenous peoples, cultures, and experiences, however, these perceptions enable us to 
understand the desires, anxieties, conceits, and assumptions of those constructing the 
image.63 To apply Sheffield's terminology to those conscripted under the NRMA, in 
articulating an image of the conscript, Canadians were also defining themselves, and when 
delineating where the conscript fit within their society, Canadians were signifying the kind of 
society they believed they possessed or hoped to achieve.64  
Amy J. Shaw builds upon similar notions in her chapter on images of conscientious 
objectors (COs) during the Great War. In light of the fact that many Canadians "viewed 
participation in the First World War as a national duty" and even a privilege, "[a]ngry 
derision" resulted from "the COs' unwillingness to join in the great national crusade."65 Her 
study, Crisis of Conscience: Conscientious Objection in Canada during the First World War, 
thus "traces the evolving definition of who could be classified as a legitimate conscientious 
objector, follows the attempts made by various denominations to have their stance protected, 
and makes the argument that gaining exemption was closely connected to perceptions of a 
denomination's respectability."66 Springing from that argument, Shaw suggests that COs 
"constituted a minority group at a severe disadvantage. Their views were unfamiliar to many 
Canadians, and the perceived need for greater unity during wartime also increased the 
distrust engendered by their alternative reading of religious obligations." 67 In turn, their 
alternative perspective on conscience, citizenship, and national duty exacerbated the 
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stereotype of the objector as cowardly, obstinate, and uneducated.68 Although religion was 
not the primary ground on which conscripts tended to voice their objection to military service 
during the Second World War, their views and understanding of the obligations of citizenship 
were far different from those of the dominant society.  
Shaw's Crisis of Conscience offers a number of arguments that can inform an 
interpretation of the historical record on conscription. First, she recognizes that the 
experience of COs is a useful lens into the developing relationship between Canadians and 
their government, expectations of appropriate masculine behaviour, personal freedom and 
identity, and questions of voluntarism and obligation in a democratic society.69 In the same 
way, we can discern a great deal about Canadian society and its identity during the Second 
World War by thinking about the place of the 'Zombies' within that society. In articulating 
their beliefs about conscripts, Canadians differentiated between those engaged with the war 
effort and those who were not. In turn, this process reveals much about Canadian 
expectations, obligations, and identity. Second, Shaw notes that, "war typically intensifies the 
perceived need for a scapegoat and for an 'other' to define oneself against; thus, a 
consideration of the reaction to the COs offers a fresh perspective on Canadian self-
perception during the war."70 The discourse surrounding objectors (or conscripts) therefore 
provides a lens through which we can discern Canadians' understanding of who they were, 
what they were fighting for, and the qualities they believed integral in their sense of self. 
Finally, while conscientious objectors' experiences in the First World War occurred before 
the 'rights revolution,' their assertion of their right to not serve in the military was nonetheless 
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part of that transformation in the discourse of citizenship.71 In the same way, conscripts' 
experiences and their alternate understanding of civic duty and expectations of government 
are indicative of a transformation in Canadian identity, and of a citizen's relationship with 
and obligations to the state.  
This thesis also draws on several historical examinations of postwar development, not 
because the events examined therein are germane, but because the arguments about identity 
offer an interpretive basis to explore evolving wartime relationships. The first of these is 
Jonathan Swainger's recent inquiry into newsprint constructions of teenagers in northern 
British Columbia, the perceived rise in juvenile delinquency, and the ensuing "moral panic" 
that played out in overheated and exaggerated reportage related to teenage culture.72 As 
Swainger writes in "Teen Trouble and Community Identity in Post-Second World War 
Northern British Columbia," in the early Cold War period, the Prince George Citizen staked 
out what it believed to be the community's most pressing issue by reporting on "a litany of 
assaults, threats, and drunkenness [that] left little question that juvenile delinquency and an 
allied gang problem could be ignored no longer."73 While newspaper commentary and 
scholarly discourse inclined towards broad explanations that place teenagers within a number 
of categories, Swainger suggests that these ascriptions render an incomplete story.74 Instead, 
he argues that while the crisis had its roots in emerging generational identities, early Cold 
War angst, and media portrayals of a society allegedly on the verge of collapse, for parents 
and community leaders, the longstanding unease over the community's reputation as a 
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disorderly lumber town provided the crucial backdrop for these broader factors.75 Swainger 
further recognizes "the newspaper hyperbole and the subsequent waves of hysteria for what 
they were," while, at the same time, noting that "the anxiety and upset associated with teen 
trouble in [the] 1950s were none the less genuine expressions of the deeply felt concerns for 
the future of families, communities, and nation."76 Thus, while residents of Prince George 
perceived a rise in juvenile delinquency and believed that the town was becoming unhinged, 
their concerns point to deeper anxieties related to community identity. Given the extent to 
which home defence conscripts represented a perceived threat to the successful prosecution 
of the war, and in a less literal sense to notions of democracy and obligation, these concerns 
warrant deeper inquiry. 
Across the border, Leerom Medovoi's work on youth identity during the Cold War 
further provides a starting point to interpret the meaning behind the 'Zombie' ascription. 
Rebels: Youth and the Cold War Origins of Identity examines the figure of the young rebel in 
postwar American culture to argue that youth rebellion and its avatars, such as Elvis Presley, 
Chuck Berry, and James Dean, emerged as a result of the ideological production of the 
United States as the "leader of the free world."77 As Medovoi artfully demonstrates, these 
young rebels soon came to represent America's emancipatory character in relation to the 
Soviet Union, emerging Third World nations, and even its own suburbs. Alongside the young 
rebel, Medovoi argues that contemporary notions of "identity" emerged in Cold War-era 
America to define collective selves in the politicized manner that is recognizable today – in 
terms such as "national identity" and "racial identity." Accordingly, the: 
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emergence of identity discourse in the United States was conditioned not only by 
postwar decolonization of the globe but also by the rapid transformations of everyday 
life within the nation's borders. While decolonization led to an intensified rhetoric of 
American freedom, the emerging postwar culture of consumption called forth a more 
complicated response in the United States, one that was often self-congratulatory, but 
at times also included palpable fears that Americans were becoming more passive and 
unfree. The identity concept spoke directly to these fears that plagued the social 
arrangements of postwar life.78 
 
This interpretative lens of identity is well suited to an inquiry of social constructions of 
Canadian conscripts in the Second World War.  
Indeed, while Medovoi suggests that identity discourse emerged in the United States 
out of the Cold War, Canadian historians have long asserted that the period leading up to and 
including the Second World War was fundamental in shaping Canada's sense of self.79 On 
one hand, the crippling decade-long depression that preceded the conflict provoked new 
thinking about the reciprocal responsibilities of the government and its citizens.80 Many 
Canadians felt that the government had failed to provide adequate relief in the interwar 
period, and consequently there was no great rush to the colors as there had been at the 
outbreak of the Great War.81 The notion that citizens had an unthinking commitment to make 
the ultimate sacrifice therefore existed uneasily. Moreover, as several other historians 
demonstrate, the nation moved slowly but inexorably away from Britain during the course of 
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the conflict and longstanding notions of Canadian imperialism soon waned.82 By war's end, 
many Canadians desired that the remaining emblems of colonialism be removed, and 
symbols of independent nationhood – a distinctly Canadian flag and national anthem, for 
example – substituted. 83 An obvious accompaniment was the Canadian Citizenship Act of 
1946, which conferred citizenship on those previously classified as British subjects. Framed 
in this context, the 'Zombie' ascription and the perspectives of NRMA recruits emerge as one 
part of identity discourse and nation building.  
Situated in this manner, this thesis examines contemporary ideas about conscription, 
arguing that the issue points to deep and significant concerns about Canadian national 
identity, government responsibility, and a citizen's obligations in wartime. Chapter One 
explores the image of the 'Zombie' conscript in English-Canadian public discourse. Given 
that contemporary notions of military service and citizenship held that the defence of the 
country was a duty incumbent on all male citizens inasmuch as Canadians believed that the 
war in Europe represented a defence of Canada and the ideals for which it stood, conscripts 
soon became disloyal and unpatriotic 'others' in the Anglo-Canadian public mind. While the 
'Zombie' ascription was a feeble-minded explanation for the NRMA personnel's resistance to 
overseas service, these constructions spoke to the profound disquiet that the conscription 
issue triggered for the nation. As this chapter demonstrates, how Canadians understood the 
'Zombies' represented both an apotheosis and a fundamental break with notions of a citizen's 
rights and responsibilities. Throughout the Second World War, many Canadians continued to 
                                                 
82 Carl Berger, The Sense of Power: Studies in the Ideas of Canadian Imperialism, 1867-1914 
(Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1970): 3-11 and 260-65; Jennifer Hamel, "A Brief History of the Writing 
(and Re-Writing) of Canadian National History" (Master's Thesis, University of Saskatchewan, 2009): 25; 
Vance, Maple Leaf Empire: 3-4 and 147; and Thompson, Canada and the End of the Imperial Dream: 3-5. 
83 Citizenship and Immigration Canada, "Towards the Canadian Citizenship Act," Forging Our Legacy: 
Canadian Citizenship and Immigration, 1900-1977, http://www.cic.gc.ca/english/resources/publications/ 
Legacy/ index.asp (last revised 1 July 2006). 
27 
 
believe that the nation was duty bound to aid the Empire and its interests. However, the upset 
and unease of the interwar years led many to question the seeming touchstones of Anglo-
Canadian life, and the anxiety that this triggered was unleashed on the nation's conscripts – 
an easy and immediate wartime target – in order to defend the values that many viewed as 
integral in their sense of Canadian identity. Of course, opposing visions of civic obligation 
found resonance in Canadian newspapers as well, and the counter-narrative reveals the 
degree to which emergent ideas had shaken assumptions. Regardless of the overheated and 
exaggerated tone of stories, editorials, and letters-to-the-editor, reports about the 'Zombies' 
provided an opportunity to explore the ways in which Canadians deployed, negotiated, and 
contested the rights and responsibilities of citizens and government, and the nation's wartime 
identity. 
Chapter Two sharpens the interpretative gaze by examining Canadian military 
discourse and questioning why the nation's military officers came to believe that the majority 
of NRMA recruits were disloyal foreigners, ignorant French Canadians, and those otherwise 
unworthy of citizenship. For many, military service was understood as both the highest 
honour and the most profound duty for any young man because it demonstrated a willingness 
to assume the most demanding and dangerous obligations of citizenship, and voluntarism 
marked the pinnacle of a democratic and freely undertaken right to choose. In conjunction 
with the military ethos of ordering and hierarchy, and the fact that a voluntary recruit was 
inherently more useful because he could serve anywhere in the world, military officers 
resolutely viewed the conscripts as an aggravation at odds with the nation's higher ideals. 
Troubled by the NRMA resistance to overseas service, the military resorted to opportunistic 
and simple-minded attempts to explain why conscripts did not share in a similar sense of 
duty. On the surface, these ascriptions reinforced the pro-enlistment willingness to fight and 
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attempted to explain why others were not similarly motivated. Framed in the context of place 
and identity in the Second World War, however, these portrayals suggest that inasmuch as 
many officers desired distinct and concrete forms of Canadian nationhood, their views of 
conscripts were actually rooted in historic concerns about Canadian imperialism and national 
identity. 
Finally, while both civilian and military reactions tended towards broad explanations 
of the NRMA recruits drawing upon ethnicity, gender, loyalty, and patriotism, these notions 
render an incomplete story of the nation's conscripts; they do little to capture the experience 
of being a conscript during the Second World War. Chapter Three thus explores why NRMA 
personnel chose to stand apart from their compatriots during the Second World War. 
Naturally, there was great variation in their reasons for remaining on home soil. Some 
preferred to serve on home soil because of family ties and religio-ethical beliefs, while others 
refused to 'go active' to protest coercive recruiting tactics and the treatment they received in 
the army as conscripts. Still others articulated something of a quid pro quo mindset rooted in 
politics; Canadians had tentatively been moving towards a reconsideration of their 
relationship to the government throughout the 1930s, and while duty had once been the 
driving force behind wartime enlistment, such expectations had begun to falter. Thus, a 
significant number wished to hold the government accountable by forcing it to implement 
conscription for overseas service rather than place undue pressure on individual men to fill 
the ranks on the front lines. While they may not have had the language to express it in such 
terms, these men were early contributors to rights and identity discourse, and they further 
expressed concerns about the reciprocal responsibilities of a democratic government and its 
citizens. These perspectives underscore the irony of the constructed 'Zombie' stereotype. 
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Taken collectively, the discourse surrounding the conscripts and compulsory service 
is significant. While the historical treatment tends to focus on the political dimensions of 
conscription, this thesis reconstructs how contemporaries conceived of compulsory service, 
how they represented it, and how it factored into their mentalité. While the political aspects 
of conscription are important, an examination of popular constructions of the 'Zombies,' as 
well as a discussion of these men in their own right, provides a more nuanced and compelling 
understanding of the conscription issue in the Second World War that has been previously 
overlooked. In conclusion and in the words of one contemporary observer, attempting to 
understand Canada's valiant overseas war effort and domestic politics on the home front is 
insufficient without "the story of the 'Zombies' who stayed at home."84
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Chapter One: 
"Is that what democracy stands for?" –  
The Image of the 'Zombie' in English Canada 
 
Throughout the Second World War, many Canadians believed that there was no 
greater national duty than serving one's country on the front lines. Yet, for those men who 
found themselves compelled to serve under the National Resources Mobilization Act 
(NRMA) of 1940, the decision to enlist involved a complex assortment of contradictory 
notions and perspectives. The federal government placed limits on the terms of service for 
the NRMA men, meaning that insofar as conscripts fulfilled their legal duties by answering 
their call-up notices, undergoing military training, and staffing defence posts on home soil, 
they could not be sent overseas against their wills. Yet as much as overseas service was 
contingent on voluntarism, conscripts were not exempt from pressure to conform. In fact, 
these men were subject to intensive internal military recruitment campaigns, ongoing social 
pressure, and government propaganda encouraging a change in status to enable front-line 
service. As a result, many conscripts eventually 'went active' and agreed to serve in overseas 
theatres of war. However, approximately 70,000 men remained steadfast and, in turn, the 
English-language press represented them in increasingly anxious and condemnatory terms.1  
Owing to popular ideas of a citizen's responsibilities in wartime, the resistance of the 
NRMA troops to overseas service troubled the nation. Inasmuch as these men had answered 
their call-up notices in order to defend the nation's borders, they had not voluntarily accepted 
service in the armed forces. Despite being law-abiding citizens, their status as conscripts 
indicated that they did not share in the dominant society's conception of duty. Notions of 
                                                 
1 According to contemporary Department of National Defence statistics, later compiled by C.P. Stacey, 
64,115 of the 157,841 men called up under the NRMA 'went active' or volunteered for service in the armed 
forces, leaving 93,726 conscripts in the ranks. Contemporary news sources reported that roughly 70,000 NRMA 
men remained stationed on home soil in late 1944. Owing to discharges and desertions, this estimate is probably 
accurate. See: C.P. Stacey, Arms, Men and Governments: The War Policies of Canada, 1939-1945 (Ottawa: 
Queen's Printer, 1970): 599-602. 
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military service and citizenship held that the defence of the country was a duty incumbent on 
all male citizens to the degree that Canadians believed that the war in Europe represented a 
defence of Canada and the ideals for which it stood.2 For many Canadians, then, an 
individual's willingness to serve in the armed forces indicated one's loyalty to the nation. The 
public therefore responded to the thousands of fit, young men who were trained for combat 
but stationed on home soil by constructing them as disloyal and unpatriotic 'others.' In so 
doing, Canadians embraced feeble-minded explanations for the NRMA personnel's resistance 
to overseas service that, in turn, gave rise to an equivocal image of the conscript. Having 
adopted the 'Zombie' epithet from popular horror films of the era, the English-language press 
zealously applied the label to those individuals who seemingly were without the motivation 
or intelligence to volunteer for service abroad.3 In time, the 'Zombie' label broadly 
encompassed a range of undesirable traits, charging the NRMA recruit with an undemocratic 
spirit, cowardly behaviour, and effeminacy. While seeming comical or overdrawn in 
hindsight, in its contemporary context, the label and its menace were genuine. As content in 
the pages of the English-language press demonstrates, these constructions spoke to the 
profound disquiet that the conscription issue triggered for the nation.  
In many respects, how Canadians understood the 'Zombies' represented both an 
apotheosis and a fundamental break with notions of a citizen's rights and responsibilities.4 On 
one hand, as demonstrated by historian James A. Wood, military service had long been 
                                                 
2 James A. Wood, Militia Myths: Ideas of the Canadian Citizen Soldier, 1896-1921 (Vancouver: 
University of British Columbia Press, 2010): 274. 
3 Some examples of these films include White Zombie (1932), Revolt of the Zombies (1936), The Ghost 
Breakers (1940), and King of the Zombies (1941). The genre proved to be extremely popular, and a host of 
'Zombie films' appeared in the 1940s, including Revenge of the Zombie (1943), I Walked with a Zombie (1943), 
Voodoo Man (1944), Zombies on Broadway (1945), Face of Marble (1946), and Valley of the Zombies (1946). 
4 I borrow here the language employed by James A. Wood in his cultural study of Canada's amateur 
military tradition and its ideological transformation during the Great War. See: Wood, Militia Myths: 272-73. 
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featured in the nation's discourse as a primary duty of citizenship.5 Throughout the Second 
World War, many Canadians continued to believe that the nation was duty bound to aid the 
Empire and its interests.6 However, the upset and unease of the interwar years spurred new 
ideas about the reciprocal responsibilities of citizens and their governments, and as a result, 
an assortment of seemingly unquestioned touchstones of Anglo-Canadian life were opened to 
scrutiny.7 The anxiety that this triggered was unleashed on the nation's conscripts – an easy 
and immediate wartime target – in order to defend the values that many viewed as integral in 
their sense of Canadian identity. Of course, opposing visions of civic obligation found 
resonance in Canadian newspapers as well, and the counter-narrative reveals the extent to 
which emergent ideas had shaken assumptions. Regardless of the overheated and exaggerated 
tone of stories, editorials, and letters-to-the-editor, reports about the 'Zombies' provided an 
opportunity to explore the ways in which Canadians deployed, negotiated, and contested the 
rights and responsibilities of citizens, their relationship with their government, and the 
nation's wartime identity. 
Public Opinion and the Conscription Issue, 1939-42 
Conscription has long been featured in Canadian public discourse. In large part, this 
was owing to the memories of the clamor over compulsory service in the Great War. It was 
the decisive issue in the 1917 federal election in which Robert Borden's pro-conscription 
Unionist Party emerged victorious over Wilfrid Laurier's Liberal Party. Borden's Military 
                                                 
5 Ibid: 212. 
6  "Canada's Paramount Interest," The Globe and Mail, 13 March 1939: 6; Stephen Leacock, "Canada 
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Doubleday Canada Limited, 1961): 392; Carl Berger, The Sense of Power: Studies in the Ideas of Canadian 
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Voters Act and Wartime Elections Act helped to decide the outcome of the election in favor 
of the coalition government. The former enabled servicemen to vote in a constituency 
assigned by the government, and the latter act enfranchised selected white women – wives, 
widows, mothers, and sisters of soldiers overseas – while disenfranchising 'enemy aliens.' 
The election exposed fault lines along linguistic, cultural, and regional divides, the most 
prominent of which was that between English and French.8 Quebec, under the ideological 
leadership of Henri Bourassa, was the most outspoken opponent of compulsory service and 
likened the implementation of conscription to an attempt to impose the will of the majority 
on a minority populace.9 Other groups, such as labor unions and western farmers, were 
initially lukewarm to conscription but soon withdrew their support when it became obvious 
that wealth would not be conscripted and farmer's sons would not be exempt from the call to 
arms.10 Following the election, conscription legislation provoked outrage. Violent rioting in 
Quebec City ensued, resulting in over 150 civilian and military casualties, as well as four 
deaths after soldiers opened fire on the rioters.11 The conscription crisis nearly tore the 
country apart in 1917, leaving a deeply scarred legacy against which the events of the Second 
World War played out.  
With war looming in 1939, William Lyon Mackenzie King's government initially 
dedicated itself to a limited war effort and eschewed conscription for overseas service to 
avoid the mistakes of nearly thirty years earlier.12 Remarkably, given the recent history, 
                                                 
8 Tim Cook, Shock Troops: Canadians Fighting the Great War 1917-1918, Volume Two (Toronto: 
Penguin Group, 2008): 370. 
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reactions in Canadian newspapers to compulsory military service were relatively placid 
leading up to and immediately following the declaration of war. Some carried stories that 
reminded the nation of King's pledges not to introduce conscription, while others 
editorialized about the events of 1917.13 In a small number of English-Canadian newspapers, 
letters-to-the-editor called for total conscription, citing equality of sacrifice or expressing 
fears about foreign-born contributions to the war effort. These, however, were rare and 
apparently failed to garner much attention.14 In French-Canadian commentary, news writers 
lamented the country's entry into another European conflict but nonetheless encouraged 
francophone support for the war effort.15 Broadly, French Canada placed its faith in Ernest 
Lapointe, King's French-Canadian lieutenant and Minister of Justice, who assured his 
constituents that he would not support a conscriptionist federal government.16 
Throughout late 1939, conscription scarcely made headlines. Following the German 
invasion of Poland, the war in Europe entered the so-called Phoney War period with its 
marked absence of major military offensives. The calm was short lived and in the spring and 
summer of 1940, Denmark, Norway, Holland, Belgium, and France rapidly fell to invading 
Nazi forces. As the tides of war began to favor the Axis powers, British expectations 
increasingly turned to dominion military participation and, with that shift, the minor and 
                                                 
13 On commentary relating to the government's conscription pledge, see: Gary Turgeon, "Thoughts 
from Parliament," Cariboo Observer, 15 April 1939: 2; and "Les projects de recrutement du minister de la 
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passive role that King intended for Canada was soon in retreat.17 The question of increased 
Canadian participation horrified the Prime Minister because of the possible political 
consequences; he recognized that any expansion of the war effort would create significant 
political instability on the home front. 
Despite the government's initial efforts to limit Canada's war effort and later to 
reassure Canadians (and especially English Canadians) that they were doing their share, 
conscription soon became a prominent topic of conversation. Public demands to enact 
compulsory service rose steadily in number and exponentially in volume.18 In response to 
home-front angst to increase Canadian participation, Parliament passed the National 
Resources Mobilization Act on 21 June 1940. As a statutory mobilization of all necessary 
resources for the war effort, the NRMA permitted the government to enforce national 
registration, control employment, seize property, and conscript able-bodied men into the 
Canadian military.19 In keeping with longstanding promises against conscription, however, 
Section 3 of the NRMA specified that these emergency powers could not compel persons to 
serve outside of Canada's borders and territorial waters.20 In effect, those drafted became 
members of the home defence army, whose duty was to defend the nation on home soil. In 
this role, conscripted men gradually began to replace general service volunteers who 
mobilized for overseas service.   
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To a remarkable degree, the NRMA compromise seemed to unite Canadians in 
support of the war. While there were some cries of dissent, the dual-system of conscription 
for home defence and voluntary enlistment for overseas appeared to be an acceptable solution 
to the problems presented in Western Europe.21 If home defence conscription was not 
uniformly popular in 1940, it was viewed as a wartime necessity.22 Moreover, French 
Canadians enlisted voluntarily in record numbers throughout the rest of 1940 and 1941, 
suggesting a measure of demonstrable support from the country's francophone population.23 
King continued to reiterate his promise that "no measure for the conscription of men for 
overseas service will be introduced by the present administration," and he further 
commended the nation for performing its duties admirably.24 In English Canada, the 
discourse was generally positive. Many commentators applauded the government for taking 
action in support of the British Empire. For example, an article in the Toronto Daily Star 
praised the policy, declaring, "It is the right step at the right time," and encouraged all 
Canadians to cooperate fully with the government's compulsory measures.25 Still, some 
critics insisted that further steps were necessary. Claiming the perspective of "loyal British 
subjects who firmly believe that Canada is morally bound to go to the aid of the Motherland 
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when she is the victim of unprovoked aggression," one editor dismissed the NRMA as 
"defective and inadequate." He went on to argue: "We cannot crush Hitler by remaining in 
North America… Any bird will defend its own nest."26 In part, the partisan nature of the 
press played its role; the Globe and Mail was a leading Conservative newspaper quite willing 
to criticize Liberal policy. At the same time, the difference of opinion evident in two of 
Toronto's major dailies reveals the difficulty of the situation and the razor-thin margins that 
distinguished popular opinion. Of course, as both stories attest, English Canadians tended to 
favor compulsory measures. The question that remained was not the degree to which 
Canadians were obliged to support the war effort – most Canadians agreed to make wartime 
sacrifices – but rather, what form would that obligation take? 
Still, for the time, the NRMA scheme placated the public. Provided the means to 
serve without going overseas, 32,000 compulsory recruits answered their call-up notices in 
the first two years following the NRMA, while three infantry divisions mobilized for active 
service in Europe.27 Apart from the early flurry of commentary, compulsory service attracted 
little anxious debate; information about who was liable for call up and what the recruits ought 
to expect of training was common, whereas editorial comment was rare.28 Notwithstanding 
the fact that the government committed itself to two finely balanced strategic goals – sending 
volunteers on the offensive in Europe and conscripting men in the event that hostilities 
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materialized on home soil – the initial response to the NRMA was generally favorable.29 The 
nation was secure, recruitment numbers held strong, and the wartime economy prospered. 
Still, there were dark days ahead. In December of 1941, the Imperial Japanese Navy 
launched simultaneous attacks against British Malaya, Hong Kong, the Philippines, and Pearl 
Harbor, the swiftness and ferocity of which stunned the Allied Forces.30 The possibility of 
attack on Canada's westernmost province loomed, and there was widespread public clamor in 
British Columbia for military intervention.31 Japan's entry into the fray heightened demands 
for an increased war effort outside of western Canada as well, especially from the nation's 
Conservative Party. Arthur Meighen, the party's leader, initiated a review of enlistment 
numbers and concluded that overseas conscription was necessary based, in part, on Quebec's 
proportionately lower enrollment numbers.32 Although there were sufficient numbers of 
volunteer soldiers to form five divisions overseas, Meighen argued that the NRMA's 
restrictions impeded the war effort writ large.33 The Conservatives were not alone in voicing 
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such concerns. With the change in fortunes on the battlefield, King was soon under attack 
from all sides for his refusal to implement a total war strategy. Criticisms surfaced within his 
own party, voiced primarily by his ministers for defence, finance, and naval services – J.L. 
Ralston, J.L. Ilsley, and A.L. Macdonald, respectively – that the compulsory measures were 
insufficient to ensure an effective prosecution of the war.34  
Alarmed by these critiques, King decided to hold a plebiscite to ask Canadians 
whether they would free the government from its promises against overseas conscription. In 
the event that the response was favorable, it would ease the way for the adoption of such a 
policy if it became desirable or necessary without compelling the government to act.35 On 27 
April 1942, King asked Canadians in his somewhat convoluted but always careful style if 
they were "in favour of releasing the Government from any obligations arising out of any 
past commitments restricting methods of raising men for military service?"36 A series of 
Gallup polls, the first in Canada, predicted that English Canada would vote overwhelmingly 
in favor of absolving the government from its pledge, but that French Canada would not. The 
actual results proved the polls to be all too accurate. Nationally, 63 per cent of Canadians 
voted yes while 37 per cent voted no. An overwhelming majority of the Anglophone 
population – 83 per cent – believed in the merits of conscription whereas only 27.5 per cent 
of French Canadian voters were in favor.37 Notwithstanding the linguistic and cultural 
fractures, Bill 80, which removed the geographical limitations on where conscripts might be 
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obliged to serve, received assent in August 1942.38 In practice, and largely in response to 
French-Canadian sensibilities, the government was able to delay ordering conscripts overseas 
until such a point that King and his advisors deemed it necessary.39  
It soon became obvious that the Prime Minister did not intend to implement overseas 
conscription, despite having obtained permission to do so, and the 'spectre of conscription' 
continued to weigh on the public mind. In a somewhat ironic development, the conscripts 
themselves came to dominate English-Canadian public discussions. Notably, in French-
speaking parts of Canada, compulsion for overseas service enjoyed little support and the 
stereotypes associated with conscripts were noticeably absent in francophone newsprint 
discussions.40 By contrast and as demonstrated in the pages of the English-language press, 
English-Canadians were more apt to fashion and then employ coded language concerning 
conscripts. Although these newspapers were not the only source or repository of public 
opinion, they did represent an evolving discourse that, with rising literacy and readership, 
captured a broad middle of Canadian opinion. 
The 'Zombie' in the Public Imagination: A Defence of Ideals, 1943-45 
By late 1942, the compulsory recruits were known across the country as 'Mother's 
Boys' (for their refusal to leave behind their families at home), 'Maple Leaf Wonders' (after 
the maple leaf-shaped badge that adorned the conscripts' uniforms in place of a regimental 
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badge), and 'R-Men' (a term that highlighted the conscripts' restricted home-duty status).41 
However, by far the most pejorative and widely used term for these men was 'Zombie.'42 The 
expression gained traction within Canadian military circles after Royal Air Force cadets 
applied it to Canadian conscripts following training in the United States in the spring of 
1942.43 Before long, Ralph Allen, a well-known Canadian war correspondent, introduced the 
term to the Canadian public, noting that it was the army's "newest name for a draftee who 
hasn't volunteered for overseas service."44 Applied intermittently by the Canadian public after 
its introduction, the term 'Zombie' became increasingly common as the war continued and 
eventually became synonymous with compulsory recruits who refused the change in status 
that would allow them to serve overseas.  
Throughout 1943 and 1944, contemporary news sources spent a great deal of time 
defining the term 'Zombie' for their readership. "The name 'Zombi' [sic]," according to the 
Toronto Daily Star, was "little known but apt. Webster defines it: 'A soulless human corpse, 
still dead, but taken from the grave, and endowed by sorcery with a mechanical semblance of 
life. It is a dead body which is made to walk and act and move as if it were alive.'"45 On the 
west coast, the Prince Rupert Daily News remarked, "With the word 'Zombie' appearing very 
prominently in the Canadian news these days, an explanation of the origin of the word might 
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prove of interest, especially as the term does not appear in most modern dictionaries." 
Accordingly, the term: 
was originated by the American author William Seabrook, famous for his first-hand 
stories of native cult rites and superstitions in Haiti and the primitive areas of the 
Belgian Congo, Nigeria, and the Gold Coast. According to him, a 'Zombie' is a person 
who has lapsed into a weird sort of existence, being neither alive nor dead and 
completely without an independent mind or soul. The state of 'Zombiism' [sic] is said 
to be brought about through a curse or 'hex' upon the subject by a witch in Haiti or a 
medicine man or witch doctor in Africa.46 
 
Notably, the origin of the 'Zombies' in West African voodoo hinted at links with people of 
color. Certainly, Canadian commentary shied away from highlighting this particular 
association, but the assumption that being white was inherently preferable to being a person 
of color existed as an unquestioned truth. As historian Graham Reynolds argues: "The 
practice of Jim Crow superseded all other social distinctions including class, occupation and 
even country of origin" during the 1940s.47 Thus, there seemed to be little worse in the white 
Canadian public mind than a close association with being black. Given its broadly negative 
connotations, the 'Zombie' label soon became the "ideal name and meaning" for popular 
perceptions of the conscripts and, as the flurry of definitions and commentary attests, the 
term had taken hold of the English-Canadian imagination.48  
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 The public catalogued a litany of insults in an attempt to explain the conscripts' 
aversion to service overseas, and in many ways, these responses were predictable. In their 
refusal to wage war on the front lines, the compulsory recruits were frequently vilified as 
lacking the courage that the nation's soldiers ought to display. "There has developed a natural 
contempt for the Zombies," wrote a Globe and Mail correspondent, because the country, 
"deplore[s] mass cowardice."49 Such allegations painting the conscripts as dastardly were 
common. Many Canadians were apt to label the NRMA recruits as "yellow rats," remark on 
their "firm determination not to risk their lives" for the nation and its ideals, or argue that 
conscripts did not have the "guts" to volunteer for overseas service.50 Deficient in fortitude 
and bravery, compulsory recruits further had to contend with challenges to their masculinity. 
According to one writer, NRMA troops did not adhere to the course of action advocated by 
their peers based on their "lack of manhood."51 Even worse than being accused of lacking 
proper masculine qualities, conscripts were portrayed as holding what were then traditional 
domestic roles held by women. In 1944, for example, a group of Toronto women petitioned 
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the government to allow them to serve on the front lines, "provided that Prime Minister King 
will release a sufficient number of draftees to keep the home fires burning until the women 
return."52 Having failed to behave like men, the compulsory recruits were supposedly suited 
to perform women's roles on the home front. Furthermore, because they did not comply with 
dominant conceptions of hegemonic and patriotic masculinity, Canadians further admonished 
the NRMA recruits because their status as conscripts was surely "a reflection of the[ir] 
patriotism."53 The NRMA soldiers were also constructed as a subversive threat on par with 
the enemy. Many Canadians drew parallels between the 'Zombies' and the "Germans" and 
"saboteurs" with whom they were at war.54 Most explicitly was a letter to the editor of a 
Winnipeg newspaper. "Until lately I have always understood that a zombie was a living dead 
man, something in the same class as were wolves [sic] and vampires," wrote one civilian, but 
instead: 
it seems that a zombie is a physically perfect man, living, but dead from his ears up. 
He can do what he is commanded, but is not capable of thinking for himself or of 
feeling for someone else. A typical Nazi sounds like that. Under the present setup 
there are two forces at war and only two—the force of evil, represented by Germany 
and her cohorts, and the force of good, represented by every decent man and woman 
in the world. You are one or the other…55  
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Given the high ideals for which the war was being waged – a defence of democracies, 
freedoms, and liberalism in the face of tyranny and authoritarianism – the apparent 
undemocratic nature of conscripts equated them with the enemy.56 In a highly charged 
wartime environment, Canadians were forced to clarify who they were and why they were 
fighting and almost as important, who was with them and who was against them.57 While 
wartime rhetoric emphasized unanimity of purpose in support of the war effort – however 
elusive it might be in practice – compulsory recruits existed in the public mind outside of the 
imagined consensus; they were the disloyal and unpatriotic 'other.' 
 Canadians held in high esteem the men who were willing to fight for the Allied cause 
and to defend the ideals for which Western civilization stood, but the NRMA men could 
claim none of the attributes that characterized the nation's front-line forces overseas.58 As 
such, the country struggled to make sense of the conscripts and their refusal to embrace 
willingly the tropes of patriotism, loyalty, masculinity, and so on – characteristics that many 
believed were vital in their sense of Canadian identity. Inasmuch as the discourse is heavy-
handed and often shrill, it is a testament to how unsettling the refusal to volunteer was for 
many Canadians. The public searched for an explanation that allowed them to avoid the 
alternate possibility that Canadians were not united behind the war effort, that there was no 
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consensus surrounding the meaning of wartime duty, and that the seeming touchstones of 
Anglo-Canadian life were no longer an unquestioned truth. The constructed 'Zombie' became 
an outlet for the dominant society to defend its values and its understanding of a citizen's 
duty in wartime, and these ascriptions indicate the degree to which Canadians were disturbed 
about the possibility that one's affiliation with and connection to the state was something 
other than what the broad middle of Canadian society imagined.  
Furthermore, the construction of the 'Zombie assumed widespread social implications. 
As R. Scott Sheffield argues in his study of the image of the 'Indian' in Canada during the 
Second World War, "the mental framework of knowledge and assumption was designed and 
created by the dominant society for its own consumption and to meet its own requirements. It 
enables the members of this society to make sense of the world around them, to impose order 
and meaning on chaos." Moreover, there were certain advantages to be had from "imagining 
the other as inferior and subordinate." It was simply the first step in realizing their 
subjugation and control.59 Viewed in this sense, Canadians employed the 'Zombie' imagery as 
one method for defending their values and ensuring that others conformed to the behaviour 
expected of patriotic and 'right-thinking' Canadians.   
 A candid editorial supports this interpretation of the image of the 'Zombie.' 
Sardonically titled, "Not a Bit of Coercion!" the writer noted: 
It has become a truism that our so-called system of voluntary enlistments for the army 
is based on back-door methods. Men are called for the home defense army in the hope 
that they will go active. Those who remain in the home army… are so often insulted, 
browbeaten and coerced into going active… This system is based on shaming, 
stigmatizing and coercing men to go active… [S]evere measures [are] taken to 
impress men into active service.60 
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Another account, and one far less sympathetic, provided counsel on how to treat the 
conscripts. "Give all these people [conscripts] a lesson where it will hurt: Ostracize them. 
Tell your friends to shun them until such time as they vindicate themselves, and the only 
solution is that they go overseas forthwith."61 In other words, conscripts deserved contempt 
until they agreed to serve on the front lines. If these men would not do 'the right thing' 
voluntarily, then they must be shamed into such behaviour. As Carl Berger writes in his 
seminal study of Canadian imperialism, many Anglo-Canadians were certain of their identity, 
their affiliation with and connection to Britain, and their duties to the state and the empire, 
and they exerted much effort trying "to bring reality into alignment with their vision."62 
Early in the conflict, civilian women had been keen to attend social activities 
alongside soldiers of any rank or status, regardless of whether the soldiers had been recruited 
under the NRMA. According to Daniel Byers, who examines the experiences of compulsory 
recruits in the first NRMA training camps in 1940, dances "provided one of the few 
occasions when women were permitted to enter military camps." In some instances, women 
were even bussed in to act as escorts.63 This, however, changed once the public became 
aware of visual cues to distinguish the conscripts. As Granatstein notes in Canada's Army: 
Waging War and Keeping the Peace: 
There were differences in the uniform, an Active soldier wearing a Canada Volunteer 
Service Medal, a Canada flash, and the cap badge of the corps to which he was to be 
posted. The NRMA soldier had nothing on his chest, a maple leaf badge on his cap, 
and no shoulder flashes. The public, in other words, soon learned to differentiate 
between volunteers and conscripts.64 
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This allowed civilians to participate in exclusionary behaviors. In addition, volunteers were 
also eligible to wear the General Service (GS) badge on their uniform, which indicated that 
they had voluntary enlisted in the army. Conscripts, on the other hand, did not receive the GS 
badge. A national advertising campaign coincident with a recruiting drive for overseas 
volunteers in mid-1944 brought the badge to the attention of the Canadian public and 
heightened awareness of who was, and who was not, a volunteer.65 
In northern British Columbia's Skeena Valley, one resident recalled how the 
community's female population used the GS badge to distinguish between conscripts and 
volunteers. "If you joined up voluntarily, well you got a GS, and if you didn't join up, 
volunteer, well you had no GS. And the zombies would come and ask you to dance, and we 
would say 'where's your GS?' 'Haven't got one,' 'forget it."66 In the province's central interior, 
another woman stated of the NRMA recruit: "If he hasn't volunteered to go overseas, we 
didn't associate with them. It was just hopeless for them to go to dances, the girls just 
wouldn't dance with them."67 Similarly, one man remembered that, "the girls were told to 
stay away from the [conscripted] soldiers" although, he added, there was never any 
"trouble."68 Elsewhere, another man believed that the conscripts in his town "were uptight" 
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because "they weren't allowed in the bars."69 Increasingly, civilian women scorned 
compulsory recruits in favour of the uniformed men whom they saw as exhibiting honourable 
wartime conduct. By 1944, as an article in the Prince George Citizen attests, entire 
communities came to treat NRMA recruits antagonistically. The Citizen reporter noted that 
the "attendance of girls at the Knights of Columbus Hut took a sudden drop… The boycott 
[of conscripts] is extending to socials and dances."70 As much as women refused to dance or 
associate with NRMA recruits, "Repercussions among townsfolks [sic]" were even more 
widespread. Many of the town's citizens "pointedly ignor[ed] the zombies."71 These shaming 
and shunning behaviors played out in interactions across the country. In Toronto, one 
newspaper noted, "Nice girls do not dance or dine with them [and] 'G.S.' personnel object to 
being associated with them under any circumstances."72 Although anecdotal, the evidence 
suggests that their unwillingness to assume the burden of citizenship meant that NRMA 
recruits were denied the benefits reserved for those with their loyalty intact.73  
As the 'Zombie' ascription demonstrates, many Canadians 'bought into' and deployed 
the rhetoric of patriotism in order to express their conception of a citizen's responsibilities 
and to defend the values they believed integral in their sense of Canadian identity. Concerned 
with the nature and extent of patriotic duty, the nation engaged in exclusionary social 
practices because the men called up under the NRMA did not seem to share in the dominant 
society's conception of duty. Of course, the attention lavished on the conscripts and the 
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breadth of how they were constructed suggests that the Canadian public was 'grasping at 
straws' to explain the NRMA personnel's aversion to service on the front lines. On the 
surface, these ascriptions centred on the act of defending the nation by way of soldiering 
overseas, but the underlying debate was much more diverse. At a most basic level, military 
service and the act of taking up arms represents one's relationship with and obligations to the 
state. The conscription debate during the Second World War reveals that many Canadians 
continued to defend staunchly old notions that one had to take up arms regardless of one's 
relationship to the state. However, as the counter-narrative demonstrates, others were 
prepared to question this notion of unthinking patriotism and unflinching commitment.  
"Decent young men who have obeyed the law" – Contesting Wartime Duty, 1944-45 
 
 Although in no way as insistent as the dominant image of the conscripts, the more 
sympathetic portrayals suggest that some Canadians wondered about the price paid for home-
front recruiting tactics and the other supposed truisms that were employed to measure the 
conscripts. As pervasive as was the dominant narrative, the mindless rush to the colors 
troubled some Canadians. According to Sheffield, many Canadians revealed a willingness to 
turn the scrutiny inward by late 1944. This willingness to look within: 
developed out of the nation's desire to create a new order, a better Canada in the wake 
of the Great Depression and the Second World War. Many people believed that 
changes were needed and that it was not enough to return to the pre-war status quo. In 
envisioning the new order, Canadians were forced to think hard about the kind of 
country they desired and to clarify the principles upon which it should be based. Such 
debate was… sincere because these were the same principles for which the country 
was fighting a total war and for which its sons and daughters were dying.74  
 
With the immediate task of winning the war seemingly well at hand, the world began to turn 
its attention to the future and shape of the postwar world. In Canada, wartime production 
peaked, full employment had been reached, and Canadians began to aspire for a new 
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beginning out of the ashes of the war. Driving this agenda were anxieties related to the legacy 
of the Great War experience and the lingering sense of dissatisfaction with its aftermath – 
inadequate provisions for veterans, widespread social unrest, and a crushing worldwide 
depression.75 The interwar period and the Second World War become a watershed era that 
scarred and transformed the nation, its understanding of duty, and most importantly, its sense 
of self.76  
 Having lived through a decade of depression and then expected to make the ultimate 
sacrifice for a nation that seemed to have failed them, some Canadians came to believe that 
they owed the nation and its government nothing more than what they were duty-bound to do 
before the law. This perspective placed a far greater onus on the government to lead, rather 
than to rely on the nation's sense of obligation to 'paper over the cracks.' Thus, one of the 
more prominent means of defending the conscripts was by casting them as victims of 
government policy, insofar as this shift in thinking required better governance. As J.H. 
Elmsley argued in his letter to the editor of the Globe and Mail, the compulsory recruits were 
"not cowards or men lacking in ordinary courage, but are informed individuals that the 
Government, in playing a cat-and-mouse game… has manoeuvred into the humiliating 
position where they are now rapidly losing their self-respect and the esteem of the public."77 
Likewise, a Toronto columnist suggested that conscripts "were not born as zombies [but] 
were created thus," and urged readers to direct "any abuse…at those who made the zombie 
army," rather than the 'Zombies' themselves.78 The uneasy coexistence of the voluntary and 
compulsory systems provoked the ire of a Winnipeg Tribune editorial as well. The writer 
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believed the system was "unfair to the draftees themselves since it shouldered upon them the 
responsibility which the government have borne." More pointedly, "It is not the Zombies 
who are the real cowards, but the Dominion government."79 The NRMA recruits had merely 
chosen an option made available by governmental policy and then fulfilled their legal 
obligations by donning the military uniform and protecting Canada's borders. "When Canada 
was in danger of invasion, these same Zombies were good enough to stand on guard day and 
night to protect us from the enemy," suggested one Manitoba resident, "But the minute that 
Canada was out of danger, these same boys are run down, called 'yellow rats.' Is that what 
democracy stands for?"80 The observation was telling. The nation's conscripts had "acted 
admirably" in defending the North American continent, risking their lives in the process, yet 
Canadians negated their efforts and constructed them as cowards who did not possess any 
sense of national obligation.81 Indeed, had it not been for the NRMA presence on the west 
coast, one correspondent was prepared to assert that the Japanese would have established 
themselves in the Aleutian Islands "a long time ago."82 While the dominant response to the 
war was to espouse moral obligation, patriotism, and the spirit of self-sacrifice, the 
sympathetic responses to conscripts suggest that at least some Canadians were troubled by 
the notion that every able-bodied man ought to be willing to make the ultimate sacrifice. 
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 According to another letter to the editor, "The draftees are decent young men who 
have obeyed the law as it stands, and have been taken from civilian jobs or schooling at the 
same inconvenience as any one [sic] else, and accepted the training prescribed for them."83 
The conscripts were not 'Zombies' who shirked their patriotic duty, but young men who 
fulfilled their legal duties to the nation-at-war. From such a perspective, the supposed 
rhetoric of patriotism that was driving the war effort was artifice. As a Portage la Prairie 
woman wrote, "Home Defense soldiers have had their lives much more disrupted and their 
contribution has been greater than a sizeable percentage of Canadians relatively undisturbed 
by the war, who sit back and demand so much of others."84 The idea that seemingly patriotic 
Canadians were not actively contributing to the war effort was a recurring theme. It was a 
perspective adopted in one rural Albertan editorial arguing that "all sections of Canada have 
given the poor old Zombies an awful beating," yet "there are many people, well able to, but 
who do not do their share in purchasing bonds. Why are these people not labelled as 
'Slackers' or 'Zombies' [and] insulted and sneered at in the daily press?"85 The proposition 
was intriguing; while many had self-righteously argued that compulsory recruits were 
undemocratic and unpatriotic, these critics had seemingly failed to demonstrate either 
character or valour. 
As much as many Canadians questioned the recruits' integrity, their defenders 
countered that the conscripts had demonstrated the "courage of their own convictions," even 
in the face of underhanded and coercive recruiting tactics.86 Following this course, a 
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Hamilton Review editorial argued that, "it takes a good deal [of] courage to answer an army 
call-up in Canada today and remain a zombie, detested and scorned among your fellows."87 
Another reporter, having observed a NRMA training exercise, came to believe that 
arguments against voluntarism were not without merit. He interviewed one conscript who 
refused to serve overseas because he had seen three of his brothers mobilized for overseas 
service and needed to care for his aging father. He alone could assume familial 
responsibilities. Another conscript was the eldest of 15 children and declined to enlist to 
provide for his younger siblings.88 In such instances, one's sense of personal obligations 
might take precedence over any arguments rooted in patriotism or civic duty. While these 
notions once existed as an unquestioned truth, the distinctions between legal and patriotic 
duty were rapidly becoming important. 
Likewise, another commentator believed, "A great many draftees have refused to go 
active as a matter of principle—it's not a question of courage or bravery or the lack of same. 
It seems to me it takes a great deal more courage to stand up for your principles and face 
public scorn, contempt and sneers, such as the Zombies are not doing, than to go active."89 
That some recruits refused to convert on principle is an important point suggesting that at 
least some Canadians were willing to contest commonly held notions of martial honor and 
obligation. Inasmuch as citizens of democratic nations have certain responsibilities to the 
state in return for protection of certain rights, those responsibilities and rights must be 
                                                 
War" newspaper database); "Found Wanting," Prince George Citizen, 30 November 1944: 2; "Conscience Not 
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War Museum's "Democracy at War" newspaper database); and "Army Absentees Told of Possible Penalties," 
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reciprocal in nature.90 For some, however, front-line military service was an exaggeration of 
this democratic principle. One loquacious editorial piece suggested that: 
the most respectful and responsible of citizens do not volunteer to pay more taxes 
than the Government demands. If they pay what they are asked to pay they are 
considered to have done their bit; to pay more would not suggest patriotism but 
lunacy. Why should they be more Catholic than the Pope? Why should they be more 
loyal than the King? If the Government says that they [conscripts] are not needed 
overseas, why should they volunteer for overseas service, disrupting their careers, 
risking their lives for an object which their own Government says is not necessary, 
for duties which the Government says are being performed adequately by the men 
now overseas?91 
 
Others were equally forthright. Despite having sent two sons into battle, one father believed, 
"If this is a democratic country then let the one who wants to fight, fight."92 Another letter to 
the editor argued that the conscripts "have not had a fair deal. I say if we have a free Canada 
let everybody do as they think best. Those that wanted to fight enlisted."93 Equally important, 
the more even-handed approaches to conscripts dictated that regardless of one's willingness 
to serve, citizens of a free, liberal, and democratic state ought to be entitled to respect.94 Even 
among those who did not necessarily agree with the conscripts' decision to remain on home 
soil, at least some Canadians believed that the nation "must overlook their faults… to build a 
better country. Canada needs the best that we can give. There will be no time for us to 
squabble with those who have served at home." More pointedly, the nation needed to 
"smother the present flame of hatred and foster a more amiable feeling" among all 
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Canadians.95 Only then could the nation re-emerge from the ashes of the war and forge ahead 
toward a promising future. 
Conclusion: Patriotic and Political Responsibility in Second World War Canada 
 In answering their NRMA call-up notices, conscripts were assured that they would 
not serve on the front lines. Yet despite this accommodation, there was a great deal of 
pressure to enlist as volunteers. The men who successfully resisted were viewed as points of 
weakness at a time when popular opinion was broadly in favor of an unflinching commitment 
to the war. Because the refusal to volunteer whispered of uncertain loyalties, these men 
became a source of profound anxiety for many Canadians. The exploration of how Canadians 
viewed and treated the nation's compulsory recruits reveals very different conceptions of 
patriotism and civic duty. For some, conscripts were the most undesirable element of 
wartime society because they were unwilling to take on similar front-line military service as 
their fellow citizens. In differing from the vast majority of their compatriots in their 
definition of political responsibility, the nation's NRMA recruits were often vilified as having 
no sense of duty whatsoever. Indeed, Canadians ascribed onto these men certain 
characteristics, such as cowardice and effeminacy, and far worse, rendered them 
undemocratic, disloyal, and unpatriotic. The nation further deployed notions of patriotism by 
attempting to coerce them into enlistment, or otherwise excluding those who did not conform 
to dominant conception of duty from their social circles. As Timothy A. Canova notes in his 
study of democratic citizenship, civic obligations were widespread, meaningful, and essential 
for victory to many during the Second World War.96  
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Still others contested this interpretation of patriotic and political responsibility. While 
their opinions were a comparatively faint rejoinder to those who scorned the conscripts and 
labelled them 'Zombies,' the counter-narrative deserves acknowledgement. For some, the 
distinction between legal and patriotic duty was important. The conscripts' willingness to 
answer their call-up notices in the defence of Canada demonstrated that these men were loyal 
and law-abiding citizens who deserved some measure of respect. For a significant portion of 
the public, ideas about the NRMA recruits were rooted in the degree to which Canadians 
embraced the pervasive rhetoric of patriotism and the allied notion that military service was a 
prime component of good citizenship. That these perspectives echoed concerns initially 
voiced during the conscription crisis of 1917 is unsurprising but there is reason to wonder if 
unsettling concerns over the depth of Canadian identity also informed the shrillness of the 
response to those who preferred not to volunteer for overseas service. As the following 
chapter will demonstrate, as much as the Canadian military drew upon similar themes in their 
attempts to understand the conscript mindset, their response was, in its own way, even more 
frustrated and disbelieving than was the general public's.
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Chapter Two: 
"We have not developed a true and strong sense of nationhood" – 
Military Constructions of the Compulsory Recruit 
 
According to Canadian military reports of the Second World War, considerable 
numbers of the nation's armed forces constituted disloyal foreigners, ignorant French 
Canadians, and those otherwise unworthy of citizenship because they did not subscribe to 
dominant ideas about civic responsibility in a liberal democracy. This perception of deviance 
specifically applied to the 157,841 men conscripted under the 1940 National Resources 
Mobilization Act (NRMA).1 Not only were these men allegedly an affront to the country's 
Anglo-Canadian sensibilities, but they seemed to be beyond the reach of any civic education 
that could transform them into 'right-thinking' Canadians. As a result, military commanders 
portrayed these supposed delinquents in internal correspondence in contradistinction to 'real' 
Canadians and cast them against the men who voluntarily answered the call-to-arms. These 
officers tended to emphasize the degree to which the conscripts, or at least their underlying 
values, were 'non-British.' This portrayal of the compulsory recruit became widespread 
throughout 1943 and 1944 in response to both the wider war and local circumstances.  
 Owing to the restrictions set out under the NRMA, the country's conscripts could not 
be sent abroad against their will.2 The men who volunteered for military service, on the other 
hand, comprised Canada's front-line fighting forces. This division within the Canadian 
military – between home defence conscripts and overseas volunteers – had its roots in the 
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troubles over conscription in the First World War, with its attendant threats to national unity.3 
The limitations placed upon the conscripts' service were a means to avoid the tumult 
associated with overseas conscription while ensuring a sufficient mobilization of all national 
resources and an effective prosecution of the war.  
Historian R. Scott Sheffield argues that serving one's country in wartime was 
understood as both a profound duty and the highest honor for any young man because it 
demonstrated a willingness to assume the most demanding and dangerous obligations of 
citizenship. Voluntarism marked the pinnacle of a democratic and freely undertaken right to 
choose.4 In conjunction with the military ethos of ordering and hierarchy, and the fact that a 
voluntary recruit was inherently more useful because he could serve anywhere in the world, 
military officers viewed the conscripts as an aggravation at odds with the nation's higher 
ideals.5 When the NRMA recruits came under intense pressure to enlist as volunteers – to 
'convert' or 'go active' in the parlance of the day – most refused the change in status that 
would facilitate their deployment to overseas theatres of war.6 The military, troubled by the 
NRMA resistance, resorted to opportunistic and simple-minded attempts to explain why 
conscripts did not share in a similar sense of duty. On the surface, these ascriptions 
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reinforced the pro-enlistment willingness to fight and attempted to explain why others were 
not similarly motivated.  
This chapter proceeds through three sections that examine how the Canadian military 
conceived of compulsory recruits and their relationship to the nation's volunteer forces. The 
discussion begins with the implementation of the NRMA compulsory training program in 
1940 to examine the military's desire to educate conscripts about their supposed civic 
responsibilities within a liberal democracy. Army administrators soon came to believe that if 
the compulsory recruits were properly educated about their wartime responsibilities, they 
would recognize that their duty rested overseas and thus 'go active.' Next, the chapter details 
the responses of military officers and commanders towards the conscripts following the 
initial training period. At the war's midway point, and within the context of localized training 
and the wider war effort, the military's attention was initially diverted from attempts to 
'convert' or 'educate' the conscripts in favour of training them to the high standards required 
of modern troops serving in the overseas theatres. The conscripts' laudatory home front 
performance encouraged a sense of hope that they would 'answer the bell' for overseas 
service. Yet, when faced with the call-to-arms in 1944, few NRMA recruits were willing to 
take up the Allied cause on the front lines. Officers thus began to search for an explanation as 
to why these men were not motivated to defend the ideals underpinning the war. In their 
increasingly desperate attempts to elucidate the conscripts' resistance, military staff 
concluded that conscripts must have been foreign to British and Anglo-Canadian history, 
traditions, and ideals. A cursory glance suggests that these constructions suggested much 
about French and foreign-born Canadians, but framed in the context of place and identity in 
the Second World War, these ascriptions were actually rooted in historic concerns about 
Canadian imperialism and national identity. 
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Conscription, Conversion, and Civic Education, 1940-41 
Military service has long been held as a means to promote better citizenship and 
foster a sense of democracy as part of one's civic responsibility.7 From the time that the first 
civilians were called up under the NRMA to begin their compulsory training, army 
administrators framed compulsory military service as an integral part of civic duty. Enacted 
in the dark days of June 1940, the NRMA was the Dominion government's response to public 
cries for a greater war effort in response to rapid German advances into Western Europe. 
Within weeks, France fell to Nazi Germany and Canada stood as Britain's largest military 
ally. The Act's intent was to mobilize the nation's resources, human and material, to ensure 
the effective prosecution of the Allied war effort.8 It provided the government with the power 
to control employment, enforce national registration, seize property, and most importantly, 
conscript men. The recently appointed Chief of the General Staff, H.D.G. Crerar, had not yet 
returned to Canada from England to assume his position as senior military advisor to the 
government, and the position of Minister of National Defence remained vacant following 
Norman Roger's death in an airplane crash on 10 June 1940.9 Lacking these key 
administrators, development of conscription policy fell to the House of Commons and, in 
particular, C.G. 'Chubby' Power, acting Defence Minister and Member of Parliament for 
Quebec South.10 Power and his staff initially considered an eight-week training program, the 
minimum considered necessary to teach basic martial skills to raw recruits but, under 
pressure owing to staff, equipment, and ammunition shortages, the schedule was shortened to 
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six weeks. By the time the first recruits arrived at training centres in the fall of 1940, the 
training period was just 30 days.11 
Within four months of the passage of the NRMA, unmarried men between the ages of 
21 and 24 began to receive call-up notices requiring them to undergo a medical examination 
before presenting themselves at one of nation's 39 basic training centres.12 These compulsory 
recruits were subject to the fundamentals of drilling, marching, discipline, weaponry training, 
and military education.13 Upon completion of basic training, the NRMA recruit was then 
posted to the Canadian Army Reserve Force unit nearest to his home. Formerly the Non-
Permanent Active Militia (NPAM), these reserve forces could be made available in the event 
that the military required their services.14 With the arrival of NRMA personnel into the ranks 
of the NPAM, militiamen and reservists could bolster the pool of reinforcements for the 
European theatre by enlisting for service overseas. 
Responses to the 30-day training scheme, especially among politicians and 
bureaucrats, were generally unfavourable. At the highest political level, the most vocal critic 
was R.B. Hanson, the interim leader of the Conservative Party, following leader Robert 
Manion's electoral defeat in the Dominion election of March 1940. Hanson charged that 
political, rather than military concerns, motivated the decision to shorten the training period 
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and, further, that the Liberal Party had failed to implement a more extensive training program 
befitting a nation at war.15 According to Hanson, "the 30-day plan could never produce 
trained soldiers and was merely a hasty improvisation" by the Liberals.16 Moreover, the brief 
training scheme signalled only "moderate participation" on Canada's part, despite the present 
conflict being "a struggle unprecedented in world history" that surely required a greater 
Canadian commitment. Indeed, if the situation "weren't so serious," Hanson would be 
inclined to describe the 30-day program "as a joke."17 J.G. 'Jimmy' Gardiner, former Premier 
of Saskatchewan and Minister for the Departments of Agriculture and National War Services, 
also voiced discontent with the compulsory training scheme. He believed that 30 days' 
training resulted in "half-trained non-soldiers," and further criticized the government's 
mismanagement of industry. Dislocating tens of thousands of men from work on farms and in 
factories for such superficial training suggested, to Gardiner's mind, out-of-step 
governmental priorities.18 
Public reception of the 30-day training scheme was mixed. Saturday Night called the 
NRMA program a "tragic joke" that would only produce men "who can just manage to form 
threes and shoulder arms if not barked at too ferociously."19 The Toronto Telegram published 
an indictment that touched on similar concerns. Thirty days' training was, in the words of one 
editorialist, "much too short to produce a force ready for the defense of this country. It is 
three times shorter than it ought to have been, and twelve times shorter than is considered 
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necessary in the United States." Foreshadowing the defence of conscripts mounted by some 
commentators later in the war, the Telegram editor believed that the program was nothing but 
a "political sideshow designed to put up a front of doing something without arousing any ill-
feeling on the part of those who are called up."20 A later editorial labelled the 30-day training 
period as "a farcical program for a nation at war." The country had apparently anticipated "a 
plan which would provide a greater army than could be raised by voluntary enlistment" but 
received "less in the way of an effective army than could have been secured by a wide open 
recruiting campaign."21 At the same time and as demonstrated in Chapter One, public opinion 
was far from unanimous. The Cariboo Observer lauded the program as a "remarkable 
achievement" that reflected "the ever-increasing tempo of Canada's war effort," while a 
Hamilton Spectator news story labelled the conscripts as the "Dominion's young defenders," 
and expected that in 30 days' time, conscripts would become knowledgeable about 
"soldiering and barrack life."22 
From within the ranks, military officers and administrators tended to agree that 30 
days' time was simply not enough time to produce fully trained troops.23 The recently 
returned Crerar was less than impressed when he observed that, "the Government is happily 
committed to compulsory training and, indeed, service but with a very superficial scheme for 
training and utilizing the man-power so called up."24 Nevertheless, army administrators 
recognized an unanticipated benefit of the scheme, one that would continue to drive the 
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NRMA training program for the rest of the war. "[T]he short training period," according to 
Crerar, "enabled a larger number of young Canadians to gain a proper conception of their 
national obligations within a given time."25 Indeed, military commanders began to envision a 
comprehensive program that would both prepare troops militarily and instill the idea that they 
were duty-bound to serve the nation overseas. Ultimately, it is difficult to gauge the degree to 
which the 30-day program convinced hesitant NRMA troops of their responsibility to king 
and country, or if the immersion in military training and ongoing social pressure actually 
factored into a conscript's decision to enlist following the training period. Nonetheless, 
historians of conscription seem prepared to assert that the program was an effective means to 
show young men that they were, as Canadian citizens, obliged to serve in the armed forces in 
time of war.26  
Following J.L. Ralston's appointment to the National Defence portfolio, army 
planners revisited the NRMA program in the hopes of instilling in the compulsory recruits 
the idea that martial service was an important obligation for male citizens. That military 
service was a duty incumbent on young men was not a new conception of citizenship, but the 
notion had largely been in abeyance since the end of the First World War.27 While it was too 
late to change the basis of the training scheme before the first recruits began compulsory 
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service, the top commanders revisited the program with an eye to increasing its efficiency at 
home and overseas. To the degree that the shortened program elicited a sense of duty in the 
conscripts and thus transformed them into willing volunteers, the military believed that a 
longer training period might also instill a sense of civic responsibility. In February 1941, the 
training period for recruits was extended from 30 days to four months. By April of that year, 
the scheme was again revised and conscripts were no longer released after four months but 
trained continuously for the duration of the war.28 When it came time to make public the 
decision to extend the training scheme to the war's end, the Prime Minister framed the 
decision in the rhetoric of duty. "It has always been recognized that thirty days training 
would not fit a man to take his place in a fighting unit," he declared, "but it was felt that the 
short training period would give a large number of Canadians a conception of their national 
obligations, and a basis for more intensive training, should that become necessary."29 He 
went on to state that he hoped the result of the extended program, "will be that every young 
man, at the time of his coming of age, will recognize and prepare himself for his 
responsibilities."30 Those called up under the NRMA would still complete their basic 
training, but would then proceed to advanced training centres, and finally to operational units 
in the Canadian Army rather than to reserve units. 
The military worked towards a compulsory training scheme that would hold troops to 
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the highest standard of training while also devising policies that dictated the 'conversion' of 
conscripts to volunteers. On one hand, the most recognizable demonstration of civic 
responsibility in young men was voluntary enlistment. On the other, convincing conscripts to 
'go active' ensured a steady stream of reinforcements for overseas. While there had been no 
system for taking enlistments under the 30-day scheme or any attempt to compile a list of 
those who expressed interest, the military realized that those compelled to serve 
"constitute[d] perhaps the most fruitful source of volunteers" for overseas service.31 Owing to 
this belief, army administrators instructed officers of training centres to encourage conscripts 
to 'go active' rather than become members of the home defence army. Military planners 
initially came to believe that the NRMA training scheme would elicit voluntarism, instill a 
military ethos, and otherwise turn troops into highly motivated and gallant soldiers. As a 
result, "The comparatively minor change of status" from conscript to volunteer "should not 
be difficult to arrange," assured Adjutant-General B.W. Browne, commander of the military's 
administrative services. He believed this to be especially true once the conscripts' prospects 
of returning to civilian life became more remote, and their prospects for lucrative wartime 
employment diminished.32  
Consequently, by mid-1941, compulsory recruits were the subject of intense appeals 
to volunteer, especially as civilian recruiting campaigns faltered and the numbers of 
volunteers declined. Officers soon began to exert a great deal of effort in their attempts to 
'convert' the conscripts, and by extension, to turn the compulsory recruits into patriotic and 
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self-sacrificing soldiers akin to their general service comrades.33 Commanding officers of the 
nation's military districts were tasked with "clearly explaining" to the compulsory recruit 
"beyond any possibility of doubt" that it was his duty to enlist in the Active Army.34 Over the 
course of a year, the Department of National Defence issued dispatches concerning the 
education and 'conversion' of the conscripts. Officers were encouraged to use any means 
short of coercion to entice the compulsory recruits to sign up for active service.35 In 
particular, they needed to stress to the conscripts "the desirability of fighting Canada's war 
overseas rather than following the unhappy example of many European nations who [sic] 
have held off to the last, finally being forced to fight over the ruins of their own country."36 
From such a perspective, it was not enough to defend Canada from within her borders, but to 
prevent the war from reaching her shores. To do otherwise risked the ideals for which the 
nation stood. Other strategies including staging competitions between companies to see 
which could produce the most 'conversions,' and offering the entire unit additional leave if all 
men volunteered. On a more personal level, officers could choose to conduct interviews with 
their men to discern why they would not volunteer, the ultimate goal being to convince them 
otherwise by negating their views. Chaplains were also encouraged to incorporate the 
importance of obligation, spirit, and voluntarism into their sermons, thus entwining one's 
civic and religious duties. At the same time, officers could rely on the civilian population to 
exert pressure on the NRMA recruits by publicly recognizing those who volunteered.37 
                                                 
33 For example, see the various instructions, correspondence, and memorandum contained in LAC, MG 
27, III, B11, Volume 68, "Compulsory Training – NRMA pressure on recruits to go active. April 1941 – March 
1942."  
34 Adjutant-General to District Officers Commanding, "'R' Recruits," 12 August 1941. 
35 LAC, MG 27, III, B11, Volume 68, "Compulsory Training – NRMA pressure on recruits to go 
active. April 1941 – March 1942," Adjutant-General to All District Officers Commanding, "Enlistment 'R' 
Recruits," 4 November 1941. 
36 Ibid. 
37 Ibid. 
69 
 
Evidently, the training centres with the best recruiting results owed a great deal to public 
spectacle, going so far as to organize community-attended parades to celebrate the men who 
enlisted, equating military service with the debt of gratitude that Canadians owed the armed 
forces.38  
Whether attributable to ongoing pressure or military education, it was clear that 
'conversions' were occurring in the training camps. Many units, and in some cases, entire 
training camps, reported that 100 per cent of NRMA enlisted for overseas service during 
basic or advanced training. In Cornwall, Ontario, all recruits in two successive months 
'converted' to volunteers in the summer of 1941, and a year later, all but one trainee 
volunteered from another group.39 At the Peterborough camp, all compulsory recruits agreed 
to serve overseas in July 1941, while Chatham, Newmarket, and Kitchener camps boasted 90 
per cent, 98 per cent, and 98 per cent 'conversion' rates respectively between July and 
November 1941.40 Military staff at the Charlottetown, Prince Edward Island camp reported 
that all but six conscripts agreed to go overseas in October 1941, while entire platoons at the 
Brantford, Ontario military camp volunteered for general service earlier that year.41 In total, 
approximately 20 per cent of all conscripts 'went active' during their basic training, while a 
further 16 per cent went on to volunteer during advanced training, thus entering the 
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reinforcement stream for overseas service.42 The remaining conscripts who did not volunteer 
for overseas service upon completing basic training joined home-front infantry or artillery 
units.  
The Burdens of War: The Conscript as Canada's Defender, 1942-43 
By the end of 1941, while the policies governing compulsory service were well 
established, the war's wider context also came to bear on the military's approach to the 
conscripts. Naturally, responding to the war abroad took precedence. In December 1941, the 
swiftness and ferocity of simultaneous Japanese attacks at strategic points in the Pacific 
stunned the Allied Forces and brought the war closer to Canada's shores.43 Rumours of 
wireless espionage and reports of offshore sightings of submarines became widespread in 
British Columbia, and the situation only worsened in the aftermath of nuisance raids on 
Estevan Point and the Japanese occupation of two Aleutian Islands.44 As public clamor for 
greater security increased, west coast defence became a top priority, and military planners 
began to mobilize home defence units for British Columbia in unprecedented numbers.45 
Even as the majority of those selected for defensive duties in British Columbia were NRMA 
personnel, army planners decided that defending the nation was a more pressing concern than 
strengthening reinforcement numbers through conscripts going active.  
Certainly, the summer of 1942 was tense. Major-General G.R. Pearkes, the General 
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Officer Commanding-in-Chief of Pacific Command, the country's westernmost military 
formation, committed his attention to the possibility of attack on the province.46 Pearkes' 
task, as he later recalled, was to build up the divisions under his charge, and to provide the 
compulsory recruits with the highest possible standard of training in case of invasion.47 
Consequently, local officers emphasized arms and weaponry instruction, discipline, drilling 
and marching, and physical education, while, at the same time, adapting the training syllabus 
to the local terrain and conditions in which troops might have to fight.48 In effect and as 
noted by one war diarist, the military stressed "the advisability of training keen soldiers 
irrespective of their willingness to go overseas."49  
Crucial to any understanding of the conscripts in the latter war years is the awareness 
of how they factored into military reports midway through the conflict. Throughout 1942, the 
conscript scarcely appeared in military correspondence emanating from active home defence 
units, certainly in contrast to the condescending manner that would later dominate the 
discourse. Instead, local officers spent time detailing the activities and training procedures of 
their units with scant references to personnel. On the rare occasion that the conscript 
appeared in the historical record, brief references were the norm: "Three reinforcements H.D. 
[Home Defence] arrive."50 The same held true for any mention of the voluntary recruit: "One 
reinforcement, active, arrived."51 More common were concise entries about the daily regimen 
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of the troops, training, furloughs, camp administration and conditions, weather, and recruits' 
health.52  
As efforts were underway to build up and train the forces in British Columbia, 
Pearkes suggested to the United States Western Defense Command that Canadians could 
participate in combat alongside American forces in the Aleutian Islands.53 Pearkes was 
enthusiastic about training the conscripted troops in British Columbia for possible use later in 
the Pacific theatre, and he assigned a home defensive unit primarily comprised of NRMA 
recruits to the task of recapturing the Alaskan island of Kiska from the Japanese.54 
Throughout the operation, Canadian officers were quick to praise the conscripts for their 
service as defenders of the North American continent. During Pearkes' inspection of 
Canadian troops at Kiska, he reported, "Discipline has been excellent and the morale of the 
troops still remains high… they are proud of the fact that they have done a good job… [and] 
they would willingly come back again if there was a chance of meeting the enemy."55 Other 
records relating to the operation contain similar acclamations. The war diarist for No. 96 
Light Aid Detachment placed emphasis on the disposition of the troops. "The morale of the 
                                                 
 52 For examples of these entries, see: LAC, RG 24, Volume 15091, War Diary of the King's Own Rifles 
of Canada, 4, 5, 6, 13, 17, 18, 24 June 1942; Volume 15291, War Diary of the Winnipeg Grenadiers, 3 and 27 
June 1942; Volume 15131, War Diary of the Oxford Rifles, 17 October 1942; Volume 15118, War Diary of the 
Midland Regiment, 12 October 1943; Volume 14718, War Diary of 5th Field Company, 12 June 1942 and 25 
July 1942; Volume 15069, War Diary of the Fusiliers du St. Laurent, 21, 22, 27, 30, 31 October 1943; and 
Volume 15143, War Diary of the Prince Albert Volunteers, 3 June 1943. 
53 LAC, RG 24, Volume 2921, HQS-9055-1, "General Staff Report on Greenlight Force from Inception 
to Despatch to Adak," 19 April 1943: 1-4; Galen Roger Perras, Stepping Stones to Nowhere: The Aleutian 
Islands, Alaska, and American Military Strategy, 1867-1945 (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 
2003): 139; Roy, "Major-General G.R. Pearkes": 54-55; and C.P. Stacey, The Canadian Army 1939-1945: An 
Official Historical Summary (Ottawa: King's Printer, 1948): 304-7.  
54 Roy, "Major-General G.R. Pearkes": 54; and LAC, RG 24, Volume 15150, War Diary of the Prince 
of Wales Rangers, Appendix I, "Shorthand Transcription of Speech of G.O.C. in C.," March 1944. Following 
the April 1942 national plebiscite on conscription (in which 63 per cent of voters responded positively), 
Parliament passed Bill 80 which repealed geographical limitations on HD service, thus enabling Canadian 
conscripts to serve in the Aleutians. 
55 LAC, RG 24, Volume 2921, HQS-9055-1, File 4, G.R. Pearkes to K. Stuart, 16 November 1943. 
73 
 
men is exceptionally good," he advised, reiterating later, "Morale was never higher."56 The 
brigade commander recorded similar praise, noting that it was a well-trained brigade group 
"with high morale, and the men were in fine physical condition and excellent health."57 
Although the Japanese retreated before the Canadian Forces were deployed, and while threats 
against British Columbia never materialized, the consensus was that the conscripted troops 
were an integral cog in the nation's war machine. The conscripts' laudatory performance on 
the home front seems to have led some to believe that these men would answer the call-to-
arms when required for overseas service. Yet however hopeful the military may have been 
during the 1943 operations, this impression soon gave way to frustration that conscripts were 
not volunteering en masse.  
Military Constructions of the Conscript, 1944 
By the end of 1943, in no small part owing to shifting Allied fortunes, it became 
obvious to military planners and civilian observers alike that the large forces stationed in 
British Columbia were no longer necessary.58 The diminishing threat from the Pacific meant 
that home-front defensive training stagnated, and many NRMA recruits came to view 
military life with apathy, desiring nothing more than to re-enter the lucrative civilian wartime 
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labor market.59 The military, however, had different plans for these men. In the spring of 
1944, the large formations of home defence conscripts were targeted by an intensive 
recruiting campaign for overseas service. In part, army administrators recognized the onerous 
fiscal and military burden of training soldiers who were not destined to fight in overseas 
theatres.60 At the same time, ongoing pressure from Russia to expand a second front made 
deployment to Europe even more pressing. While emphatic calls went out for more 
volunteers, military planners looked to the large numbers of compulsory recruits who 
remained in Canada as a potential source of manpower for the European theatre.61  
Recruitment campaigns were thus organized within the large formations of home-
front troops in the spring of 1944. In Eastern Canada, acute pressure was felt among troops of 
the Dufferin and Haldimand Rifles (Sussex, New Brunswick), Le Regiment de Joliette 
(Rimouski, Quebec), and Le Regiment de Montmagny (St. John's, Newfoundland).62 Officers 
delivered compelling speeches to rally the troops and met with individual conscripts to 
emphasize that their duty rested overseas.63 Despite their best efforts, military staff could not 
convince hesitant NRMA men to cross the ocean. In the westernmost province, owing to the 
failure of the campaign in central and Atlantic Canada, NRMA recruits faced even more 
intense pressure to volunteer. In Vernon, in addition to the same measures undertaken in the 
east, three Victoria Cross recipients visited the camps to relay and glorify their experiences, 
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and camp padres once again received instructions to discuss the issue in their sermons.64 
The 'gloves off' recruiting campaign was initially met with enthusiasm by Vernon's 
military staff. "[G]lad tidings from Ottawa were announced," reported the war diarist of Le 
Régiment de Hull. "It has been decided to give [us] a chance to go overseas… if sufficient 
NRMA personnel would enroll for active service. The campaign of enlightement [sic] is to 
start immediately. After nearly five years of anxious waiting it seems too good to be true."65 
The junior officer's ardent energy was all too evident at the outset of the campaign, but it 
quickly gave way to resentment because of the steadfast refusal of the conscripts to assume 
front-line service. Officers soon concluded that the troops' home defence mentality was "a 
hard nut to crack," and decided that the conscripts least likely to 'convert' – the camp's most 
"obdurate and recalcitrant souls" –  ought to be transferred out of their barracks and into a 
nearby tent camp known derisively as "Tentville" or "Zombeeville [sic]."66 While the Vernon 
camp reported some successes during the recruitment campaign, this was due to the fact that 
the pressure trickled down to nearly every unit stationed in British Columbia. Any conscript 
who volunteered for front-line service transferred to Vernon, and in turn, one of Vernon's 
unwilling conscripts assumed his place in his respective unit.67 At the end of the recruiting 
drive, the 13th Infantry Brigade moved eastward and then overseas, but it had been a difficult 
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month for officers, many of whom grew disenchanted with those men who did not share the 
pro-enlistment perspective. 
Within this context of increasing demands for European front-line troops, military 
officers set out to explain the conscripts' staunch resistance to overseas service. Increasingly, 
this discourse centred on ethnic characterizations linked to issues of obligation, loyalty, and 
nationhood. As historian Peter A. Russell writes, officers "used ethnicity to explain away the 
contradiction," they felt in what they saw as 'British disloyalty.' If the troops had been of 
British origin then they could not be so disloyal as to contradict their officers by refusing to 
volunteer to go overseas.68 Officers thus inclined to represent the conscripts as being foreign 
to Anglo-Canadian norms, using ethnicity to explain the NRMA recruits' apparent disloyalty 
to their king and country.  
In spite of the fact that men of non-British ethnic backgrounds were called up under 
the NRMA in proportionate numbers to the national average, stereotypes rooted in 
'nationality' and 'race' dominate military discourse about the conscripts.69 The implication 
that non-British members of society were not fully enthusiastic members, not properly 
'English,' was hardly a new accusation, but the strong desire for national unity brought about 
by the war made their perceived differences an even greater offence. Brigadier W.H.S. 
Macklin's oft-quoted report on the resistance of the NRMA men to overseas service 
illustrates this tendency. "The great majority are of non-British origin," he believed, with: 
German, Italian, and Slavic nationalities of origin probably predominating. Moreover 
most of them come from farms. They are of deplorably low education, know almost 
nothing of Canadian or British History and in fact are typical European peasants, with 
a passionate attachment for the land. A good many of them speak their native tongues 
much more fluently than they speak English and amongst them the ancient racial 
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grudges and prejudices of Europe still persist. Here again the process of converting 
these men into free citizens of a free country willing to volunteer and die for their 
country will be a matter of education, and I think it will be slow. At present there is 
negligible national pride or patriotism among them. They are not like Cromwell's 
'Good soldier' who 'knows what he fights for and loves what he knows'. They do not 
know what they are fighting for and they love nothing but themselves and their land. 
This fact must be recognized.70 
 
In ascribing these characteristics to his troops, Macklin demonstrated a seeming absence of 
self-awareness. While historians of conscription J.L. Granatstein and J.M. Hitsman 
characterize Macklin as "an intelligent, able, and experienced officer" who was simply 
"perpetuating myths," his line of thinking requires further explanation.71 For Macklin, the 
refusal to enlist was simply incomprehensible. In time, he came to believe that conscripts 
lacked the necessary values that Canadians ought to possess, and in turn, that they simply 
must have been of non-British origin. Owing to his own white Anglo-Saxon values, he saw in 
the troops a lack of respect for the British democratic and liberal values on which Canada 
was founded. Further exacerbating the problem was the conscripts' supposed ignorance of 
Canadian and British history and traditions in concert with their alleged eagerness to hold 
onto the ancient grudges of their people. If the troops had any appreciation for their country 
and its inherited British traditions, they would not be so unreasonable as to refuse service 
abroad. At once, in his search for a universal explanation, Macklin reinforced the rationale 
behind the war as a defence of democracies, and justified his own pro-enlistment perspective 
by implying that those willing to fight were proud, patriotic, and dutiful citizens.   
Given the limitations of the historical record, it is difficult to know with certainly the 
ethnic compositions of individual units, but we do know that the ethnic composition of the 
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NRMA men was a cross section of Canadian society.72 The impression that the majority of 
conscripts were of non-British descent is therefore problematic. Nevertheless, these 
ascriptions still dominate the historic and contemporary discourse. Outside of Macklin's unit, 
other military staff similarly represented their men as possessing unfavourable ethnic 
characteristics to explain the disloyalty that they believed ran rampant among NRMA 
recruits. For example, Company Sergeant Major G. Campbell of the Prince Albert Volunteers 
believed there to be "Quite a few [men] of German extraction" in his unit, which led him to 
dismiss his troops as being "typical Zombies."73 Owing further to the perception that men of 
German origin were overrepresented in the ranks of the NRMA, officers assumed that they 
had "no interest at all in being good soldiers."74 The implication was that the conscripts' 
ethnic backgrounds prevented them from recognizing that military service was a prime 
component of male citizenship. 
Major-General R.O. Alexander, a career officer who rose to the ranks of Inspector 
General, came to similar conclusions during his inspection of the Terrace Military Camp. 
Unimpressed with the camp's conditions and the troops stationed therein, he perceived in the 
men "a complete indifference as to what is going on in the war," compounded by "an attitude 
of lassitude and almost defeatism."75 Of course, regardless of one's ethnic background, not 
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every individual is cut out to be a soldier, nor is every young man able to thrive in a military 
culture, but Alexander assumed that such traits as an attitude of defeatism and an indifference 
to the war were inexorably linked to ethnicity. Consequently, he believed that the camp must 
have contained "a large number of men of Central European descent."76 At best, the recruits 
were "a very mixed lot… of mediocre quality."77 At their worst, they lacked any sense of 
moral fibre that characterized patriotic and right-thinking Canadians. The officer seemed 
incapable of seeing anything but defeatism and indifference among the NRMA troops, and 
thus favored easy explanations centred on the conscripts' supposed place of origin.  
The assumption that conscripts were ethnic foreigners who resisted overseas service 
because they had little faith in the prospects of the Allied war effort was widespread. 
Lieutenant-Colonel J. MacGregor characterized the NRMA conscripts as having greater 
confidence in the military might of the Axis powers than they did in any of the democratic 
nations.78 Furthermore, he believed this attitude to be especially preponderant among "those 
of European extraction."79 In Vernon, Lieutenant W.E. Sanders asserted that his own 
company was similarly comprised of a large "percentage of citizens who are foreign born or 
are of foreign parentage. Many of them have never tried to understand us or our country and 
don't seem to give a dam [sic] whether we rule it or someone else does."80 While Sanders' 
own attitude was cynical, he was alarmed, nonetheless, by the troops' apparent lack of 
national spirit; because the conscripts did not seem to care if the nation's democratic customs 
prevailed, they were represented as a threat to the war effort and to the country writ large. 
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After all, the patriotic discourse in the Second World War featured prominently the idea that 
the war pitted democracy and freedom against tyranny and oppression.  
The primary evidence and the historiography suggest that these officers were 
incorrect in casting the conscripts as being predominantly non-British. As historian Daniel 
Byers argues, using contemporary statistics compiled by the Department of National 
Defence, the compulsory recruits roughly mirrored the ethnic composition of Canadian 
society, and foreign-born conscripts were actually underrepresented in the ranks of the 
NRMA. Accordingly, 92.0 per cent of NRMA men were Canadian born, 1.9 per cent British 
born, 1.2 per cent American born, and 4.5 per cent European born. The remaining 0.3 per 
cent were born elsewhere in the world, or else their place of origin was not identified.81 
Furthermore, of the men remaining in home defence units in 1944, approximately 17,000 
spoke English as their first language, 12,000 spoke French, and 15,000 spoke another 
language as their native tongue.82 While not directly centred on ethnicity, the evidence 
suggests that the NRMA men simply reflected the composition of the larger society. 
The allegations that conscripts tended to hail from Central or Eastern Europe led staff 
of Pacific Command's headquarters to assert later that the conscripts were "not confined to 
any one nationality, but comprised a cross-section of all Canadian provinces."83 That the 
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Command's own staff recognized that the stereotypes were inaccurate lends itself to the 
assertion that the discourse surrounding the country's NRMA recruits reveals more about the 
pro-enlistment critics of conscripts than of the conscripts themselves. Indeed, even the army's 
internal regulations permitted the discharge of troops on the grounds of ethnicity. If troops 
were of "enemy nationality or origin," they posed a security risk. Yet, NRMA recruits were 
not discharged under this regulation in substantive numbers, suggesting that perceptions of 
compulsory recruits as ethnic foreigners had little, if any, basis in reality.84 Therefore, while 
the compulsory recruits were neither predominantly foreign-born nor overwhelmingly 'alien,' 
many officers constructed them as such because it helped to explain the conscripts' supposed 
disloyalty to the state while also justifying the officers' commitment to the cause. To the 
degree that NRMA recruits who refused overseas service were disloyal, foreign to Canadian 
values, unmotivated, or unpatriotic those who supported enlistment were, by contrast, brave, 
loyal, and patriotic. 
In their internal commentary, the military depicted another discrete group of NRMA 
recruits as failing to adhere to British and Anglo-Canadian sensibilities: French Canadians. 
Unlike the assumption that many conscripts in the ranks were overwhelmingly Central or 
Eastern Europeans, a notion that is simply unsupported by the historical record, French 
Canadians were slightly overrepresented in the ranks of the NRMA.85 Furthermore, 
francophones tended to be posted to designated francophone or bilingual units in which 
training was conducted in their native tongue, leaving little question that these men hailed 
from French Canada. Thus, while the military's discourse surrounding French Canadians 
featured similar assertions of Anglo-Saxon superiority, officers did not need to ascribe an 
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unfavorable ethnicity to these men to explain their apparent disloyalty. Instead, they drew on 
unfavorable stereotypes.  
French-Canadian recruits were easy fodder for officers owing to historical 
experiences leading up to the 1939-1945 conflict. The passage of time did little to heal 
antagonisms, and instead even reinforced the reluctance of French Canadians to participate in 
Canada's military affairs by the Second World War. The contentious issue of separate 
schooling in New Brunswick and Manitoba at the turn of the century, imperial participation 
in the South African War, and the restriction of French-language instruction in Ontario 
schools in the 1910s, had all left a mark.86 Canada's entry into another imperial war in 1914 
at the behest of English Canada further led many French Canadians to distance themselves 
from the war effort, and three years later the shortage of volunteers prompted Anglo-
Canadian complaints that French Canada was not providing its fair share of men. A recruiting 
drive in Quebec ensued, but not enough men stepped forward to fill the gaps in the ranks. Sir 
Robert Borden and his Conservatives thus turned to their gaze towards conscription. The 
debate surrounding compulsory service polarized the nation along ethnic lines, and the issue 
was made worse by a gerrymandered federal election, which was then followed by 
widespread desertion and evasion of the law, as well as violent rioting in Quebec City and 
Montreal.87  
The question of French-Canadian enlistment in the 1939-1945 conflict was especially 
fraught given this history and the remaining old wounds. When asked to release the 
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government from its earlier promises against conscription, 72.1 per cent of Quebec voters 
declined to support compulsion, as compared to 22.9 per cent of Canadians outside of 
Quebec who also voted 'no.'88 In other parts of the country, French-Canadian constituencies 
also voted overwhelmingly against compulsory service in the plebiscite.89 According to 
Granatstein and Hitsman, the results of the plebiscite demonstrated clearly the differences in 
attitude that existed in Canada towards the war and conscription, and by extension, ideas 
about a citizen's duties.90 That large numbers of French-Canadian conscripts refused overseas 
military service in the Second World War came as little surprise to officers and commanders, 
who easily dismissed francophones as lacking proper Anglo-Canadian sensibilities.  
The military made several important inroads in the Second World War in terms of 
recruiting in Quebec, promoting French Canadians to the ranks of commissioned officers, 
translating training programs into French, and creating new French-speaking battalions. 
While French Canadians gained the ability to function within the Army to an extent greater 
than ever before, the stereotype of the disloyal French Canadian nevertheless persisted.91 
According to W.A.B. Douglas and Brereton Greenhous in their popular history of Canada in 
the Second World War, few English-Canadian soldiers and officers were willing to accept, 
let alone accommodate, French Canadians into their units.92 The authors suggest that 
"prejudice played its part" in the exclusion of francophone troops, a statement supported by 
historian Jody Perrun in her inquiry into unity and morale in Second World War Winnipeg.93 
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While French-English relations had improved in the 1939-45 conflict from an all-time low 
during the Great War, the image of a nation united behind the war effort did not reflect the 
home-front reality.  
Poor reception of French-Canadian recruits is evident in much of the military's 
discourse for several reasons. First, ascriptions about ethnicity are rooted in white privilege, 
and in this instance, English-Canadian privilege. In Canada's social and cultural history, 
'whiteness' and 'Britishness' have become the cultural norm; English Canadians are thus 
empowered to decide when and how they discuss ethnicity, while rarely embracing a 
perspective that appreciates that being English Canadian is an ethnic identity in its own right. 
By comparison, French-Canadians, indigenous peoples, and other non-British minorities are 
excluded from this Anglo normativity.94 Second, and stemming from the first, while there 
was measurable progress in commissioning French-speaking troops, English-speaking 
officers remained overrepresented in the ranks of senior officers. Memorandum from the 
Oxford Rifles, a predominantly English-speaking unit, serves as one such example. The 
commanding officer contacted Headquarters in February 1944 in regards to a recent draft of 
French-speaking troops. His telegram was frank: "They are French speaking personnel… 
May permission be granted please to return this personnel to depots concerned."95 The officer 
evidently anticipated difficulty administering the francophone recruits, and probably 
expected them to be beyond the influence of civic education. After all, the prevailing line of 
thinking was that all French Canadians were strong anti-conscriptionists. Thus, even before 
becoming acquainted with these troops, the officer wanted nothing to do with them because 
                                                 
94 Andrew Baldwin, Laura Cameron, and Audrey Kobayashi, eds., The Great White North: Race, 
Nature, and the Historical Geographies of Whiteness in Canada (Vancouver: University of British Columbia 
Press, 2011): 1; and Daniel Coleman, White Civility: The Literacy Project of English Canada (Toronto: 
University of Toronto Press, 2006): 3-4. 
95 LAC, RG 24, Volume 15132, War Diary of the Oxford Rifles, Appendix 11, Telegrams, 11 February 
1944. 
85 
 
he assumed that the training experience would be unsuccessful, and he likely did not want it 
to reflect on his own service record. These same concerns played out in Prince Rupert in the 
lines of the Winnipeg Grenadiers. According to the anglophone war diarist, the arrival of a 
French-speaking regiment to the predominantly English-speaking camp rendered the unit as 
"a real cross-section of Canada." At the same time, the unit's composition led the diarist to 
note further, "it is hoped that we will be able to set an example in harmony."96 Although the 
officer spoke of hope in incorporating the newly arrived troops, the tone of the entry seemed 
to belie any optimism for success.  
Apart from the difficulties of mixing English and French Canadians, the latter group 
was problematic to officers in their own right. In part, this was due to the absence of bilingual 
or French-speaking individuals in command positions. As Brigadier Macklin aptly stated, 
"the French-speaking portion of the army in many ways presents a separate and distinct 
problem."97 Officers were "somewhat disgusted with the attitude" of French Canadians. The 
military believed these men reflected poorly "on the many thousands of brave Fr. Canadians 
serving all over the world on every battle front."98 The very fact that francophones enlisted in 
record numbers and served in every theatre of war works to expose the artificiality of the 
stereotype. Nevertheless, the military drew on Quebec's longstanding resistance to 
conscription to paint the picture that French Canadians were not loyal Canadians. Officers 
stressed the improbability of inducing French-speaking NRMA soldiers to volunteer, likening 
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it to a miracle.99 The conversion of francophone conscripts, in the words of one officer, "will 
be a process of education and my opinion is that it will be a long process."100 After all, 
English Canadians had endeavoured to 'educate' French Canadians since the Conquest and 
had yet to make progress. 
Akin to the reports that emphasized the perceived traits of continental Europeans, 
officers were equally keen to reduce the French-Canadian conscripts to cultural stereotypes. 
In one such report, despite a prefatory assertion to the contrary, the commander of Le 
Régiment de Hull was as dismissive of his French-Canadian troops as his colleagues had 
been of the men they perceived to be non-British. "It is our opinion from discussions with 
officers of English-speaking units," wrote Lieutenant-Colonel L.J. St. Laurent, that the 
mentality among NRMA personnel "has been developed generally upon similar lines with 
only slight variations attributable to nationality."101 While the evidence suggests that a certain 
mentalité did develop among the compulsory recruits, the "slight variations" that St. Laurent 
observed turned into a pointedly scathing critique of the French-Canadian conscript imbued 
with cultural and gendered inferences: 
Some are passionately and strongly attached to women's apron strings with a childish 
simplicity. Their mothers, wives or sweethearts have warned them that to sign active 
for overseas service would break their hearts, endanger their faltering health, 
jeopardize their future – they would be through with them etc. etc. Expectant mothers 
have warned against what might happen to the incubating child if the sire should 
leave Canada. Mothers with sons overseas are loath to see another go… Many 
phoned, wired or wrote home for permission to enroll, but were denied it. Others are 
just hiding behind women's skirts.102  
 
St. Laurent concluded that such excuses were "powerful deterrents to the family-loving 
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French Canadian."103 Officers only had to look to the example of the self-sacrificing men 
overseas to negate the notion of familial obligation as a valid reason for not enlisting. 
Lieutenant-Colonel R.J. Bolton, for example, impressed upon his troops that, "There is no 
such thing as a family reason. The days are past when a married man should stay at home 
with his family and let the single man do the fighting. Family reason is a damn good reason 
why you should go overseas."104 Bolton further queried, "If you aren't ready to fight for your 
own wife and children, how can you expect the single man to do it for you?"105 At the same 
time as the voluntary system consumed the nation's patriotic, self-sacrificing, and brave 
young men, the French-Canadian conscripts remained on home soil in safety "to propagate 
the race."106 An attribute that would ordinarily be extolled as a virtue – the love of family – 
was quickly transformed into a weakness. Officers invariably portrayed French Canadians as 
being ruled by the women in their lives, and from there, it was a small step to characterize 
them effeminate or sexually suspect. From such a perspective, French Canadians stood 
outside of commonly held ideas of military masculinity, which centred on bravery, physical 
strength, endurance, and something of a stiff-upper lip.  
 The seeming ease with which St. Laurent criticized the French Canadian conscripts 
continued throughout his report. "When service in England is mentioned," he asserted, "a 
certain amount of antiquated ingrained objection is resurrected by a few to bolster their not 
wishing to 'fight' for the English."107 Akin to the inappropriate "ancient racial grudges and 
prejudices of Europe" that Macklin witnessed, St. Laurent believed that the antiquated 
animosity of French Canadians for their anglophone counterparts was deeply ingrained. "This 
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vague, remotely-founded anti-English feeling," St. Laurent continued: 
has been fanned into heat at convenient intervals by political opportunists and would-
be nationalists throughout our history. The Englishman has always been the patient 
butt of particular and well-timed hate campaigns, having been assigned responsibility 
for everything from crop failures to the failure of the favorite son to pass school 
exams. Anyone who speaks English is classified generally as English in their minds. 
This small minority, some of whom are Acadians, have heard their parents, relatives 
or friends rant against "Les Anglais." Their history books cease to be interesting after 
the fall of Quebec in 1759… [Yet] it was the same English who safeguarded and 
guaranteed their freedom, religion and language during the intervening years.108 
 
Lacking self-awareness in ascribing these traits to the francophone troops, St. Laurent 
certainly would not have counted himself among the political opportunists and would-be 
nationalists. Yet, perhaps ironically, he believed that it was the French Canadians who were 
conveniently 'fanning the flames' of anti-English sentiment in their refusal to volunteer. 
 The final affront to the military's sensibilities was that French Canadians supposedly 
had no conception of democratic values. These men had "never been trained from childhood 
to make important decisions or to think for themselves. They have always been led or 
advised. They are not yet fully educated for democracy."109 Drawing on anti-Catholic 
sentiment, the officer implied that these troops were led from the pulpit and ultimately Rome. 
Such a disposition made French Canadians ill suited for democracy, or so St. Laurent 
claimed. While officers praised the liberal and democratic foundations of Canada, inherited 
from imperial mother Britain, they were equally willing to reject the conscripts by assuming 
that they were poorly educated about these principles and the British traditions on which they 
were founded.  
While Canada slowly but inexorably moved away from its inherited 'Britishness' in 
the postwar period, wartime rhetoric continued to stress the importance of the imperial 
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connection.110 Throughout the conflict, many Canadians (and especially English Canadians) 
felt a strong emotional tie to Britain. Contemporary observers made it clear that the war was 
being fought to protect British democratic freedoms, while the scholarly discourse similarly 
emphasizes the degree to which Canada's primary motivation for declaring war was that of 
obligation to aid in the defence of the empire.111 English Canadians tended to assume that 
others must feel, or at least ought to feel, the same way. As Sheffield writes, "[f]rom this 
supposition sprang the arguments used to encourage French Canada to support the war effort 
for France, if not for Britain. It mattered not that the francophone population felt little or no 
connection to its old imperial parent nor much desire to save it from fascist aggression."112 
St. Laurent and his fellow officers conceived of the conscripts in wholly negative terms based 
on the troops' apparent inadequate knowledge of British customs and history. Ostensibly, had 
these men been able to let go of their separate and distinct history as French Canadians, they 
would have immediately rushed to the colours to support the Empire. The military's internal 
correspondence clearly privileged a national unity built upon Anglo-Canadian values. In 
times of war, when unity of purpose is so highly valued, those who did not appear to conform 
to acceptable norms stood outside of the picture of unanimity.113 
Constructions centred on ethnic identity were the military's primary means to explain 
the conscripts' supposed disloyalty, but issues of patriotism and education permeate the 
historical record and cut across ethnic lines. "As regards the English-speaking NRMA 
soldiers who refuse to volunteer," noted one officer, they "have no patriotism or national 
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feeling what-ever."114 Regardless of their 'nationality,' the remaining NRMA men were 
believed to be "beyond the influence of any education which can be imparted to them in a 
few weeks or months."115 Although there was some recognition that insulting the conscripts 
was a poor way to induce them to 'go active,' military officers often used slanderous 
nicknames both 'on the ground' and in their reports.116 Some examples include "dirty yellow 
Zombies," "yellow bastards," and "hesitant sheep."117 The term 'Zombie' called into question 
the conscripts' intelligence, while in the military context, 'yellow' denoted cowardice. We 
might infer that 'hesitant sheep' implied that conscripts had to be shepherded or led into 
enlisting for active service while also pointing to a group mentality signifying that conscripts 
were not able to think for themselves. Even without resorting to name-calling, by the end of 
1944 the image of the conscript was a wholly negative one. One officer called into question 
the conscripts' intelligence when he reported to his superior that, "The minds of many of 
these men move slowly."118 Rather than implying that conscripts were not quick witted, the 
officer painted the picture that a right-thinking Canadian would have immediately donned the 
khaki the moment his country needed him. The recruits, however, chose to stand outside of 
this picture of solidarity and sacrifice, and appeared to be unmoved by any methods of 
persuasion.  
Conclusion: Canadian Identity in the Second World War 
Inasmuch as these developments might be understood through the dominant 
interpretive ethos of French and foreign-born Canadians or their descendents, the meaning of 
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these ascriptions seems to be rooted in historic concerns about national identity. The 
resistance of the NRMA men to front-line service was evidence to some that the nation had 
failed to foster in its citizenry any sense of national obligation or democratic responsibility. 
In this light, the conscription crisis itself might be viewed as a manifestation of these failings. 
At the same time, the refusal of compulsory recruits to volunteer for military service hinted at 
the country's poorly developed sense of identity. According to one officer, recruiting within 
the ranks of the NRMA brought to light the fact that the nation did not have "a national flag 
to wave proudly in front of the men."119 Instilling a sense of one's duty to one's country was 
an egregious task when that country scarcely possessed a sense of self. 
Officers stressed the importance of the Canada's connections to Britain by 
emphasizing the nation's underlying Anglo-Canadian values. They expressed concerns about 
the degree to which the Canadian nation lacked an identity of its own. As another officer 
wrote of the campaign to elicit NRMA voluntarism: 
We are endeavouring to 'sell Canada', to instill and awaken patriotism and a sense of 
duty to our native land – something that should have been a national, educational, 
and parental responsibility from the cradle…The cowardly sins of omission are 
bearing fruit. We have not developed a true and strong sense of nationhood. 
Physically we are a mighty nation, nationally we are children.120  
 
The same officers who depicted the conscripts as ethnic foreigners with a strong aversion to 
British history and traditions were uneasy with the fact that a sense of Canadian nationalism 
had yet to replace the imperial connection as an effective anchor for identity. However much 
they stressed that Canadian civic virtues were closely tied to Britain, their own conceptions 
of citizenship were increasingly influenced by the notion of something more distinctly 
Canadian.  
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According to Carl Berger in his seminal study of place and identity, Canadians' sense 
of nationality and the ideal of imperial unity were interlocked and identical in the period 
following Confederation.121 Anglo-Canadians in particular believed that the Empire provided 
the best framework within which the Canadian nation could grow and develop. Indeed, the 
country had "an intense awareness of [its] Canadian nationality combined with an equally 
decided desire to unify and transform the British Empire so that this nationality could attain a 
position of equality within it."122 Thus, to be both a Canadian and a British subject 
simultaneously was not a contradiction, nor was it merely adopting a derivative identity.123 
The events of the early twentieth century, however, undermined the appeal of imperialism for 
many Canadians. The Dominion's participation in the Boer War initially suggested that a 
permanent means of union would be formalized with Britain, but it instead nourished a sense 
of Canadian self-confidence that loosened rather than cemented the ties of Empire.124 
Ongoing disputes over the Alaskan territorial boundaries at the turn of the century further 
contributed to a surge of Canadian nationalism that was separate from their identity within 
the Empire.125 Even the Great War, greeted by initial Canadian enthusiasm, soon led to 
disenchantment and disillusionment, and strengthened suspicions of the old world and of 
empires.126 
Historians tend to agree that the First World War was Canada's war of independence 
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through the narrative of colony to nation.127 By way of battles won and lost in the trenches of 
Europe, Canada laid tangible claims to independence that materialized in a signature on the 
Treaty of Versailles, a seat in the League of Nations, and a right to sovereignty under the 
Statute of Westminster. At the same time as Canadians looked to concrete forms of 
nationhood, they turned their gaze inward in an attempt to "'Canadianize' a population that 
had either been coarsened by the brutality of war or, as new Canadians, had never been 
exposed to…democracy and justice."128 Despite this gradual shift away from Britain and 
toward a distinct sense of self, the Second World War provided another rallying point around 
the Empire. Canadian economist and humorist Stephen Leacock brilliantly captured the 
imperial connection in 1939: "If you were to ask any Canadian, 'Do you have to go to war if 
England does?' he'd answer at once, 'Oh no.' If you then said, 'Would you go to war if 
England does?' he'd answer, 'Oh yes.' And if you asked, 'Why?' he would say, reflectively, 
'Well, you see, we'd have to.'"129At the same time, the shrill patriotism of the war years might 
be understood not as unflinching Canadian support for the war, but rather the last and final 
call to Empire for a nation that wondered where its duty rested. In this framework, the 
conscription issue becomes evidence of an identity crisis for many Canadians. The country 
had expressed patriotic sentiment in answering the call to defend Britain, parliamentary 
government, and democracies, but the conscription issue demonstrates that the nation – and 
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especially its military commanders – was unsettled by its supposed affinity and affiliation 
within the Empire during the Second World War. The discourse on the conscripts' character 
suggests that, in their role as civic educators, the military clamoured for a definition of what 
it meant to be Canadian, and pointed to the nation's relative immaturity with its lack of a 
distinctly Canadian national symbols and a concrete sense of self. 
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Chapter Three: 
"A lot of bad feeling and unnecessary trouble" –  
Canada's Conscripts in the Second World War 
 
From the outset of the Second World War, William Lyon Mackenzie King's 
government made extensive promises concerning conscription in the hope of avoiding a 
repeat of 1917. Yet as early as May 1940, Axis battlefield victories forced the government to 
enact a series of measures that both escalated the country's commitment to the war and called 
into question the government's commitments. The most important policy shift was the 
National Resources Mobilization Act (NRMA), which authorized conscription for home 
defence in order to mobilize general service soldiers – those who had enlisted voluntarily – 
for service overseas. The men called up under the NRMA were liable for military service on 
Canadian soil, but were not obliged to serve overseas. Owing to these geographical 
restrictions, the military increasingly resorted to aggressive recruiting tactics that placed 
compulsory recruits under immense pressure to volunteer to serve on the front lines. As 
detailed in Chapters One and Two, the conscripts who withstood this pressure became the 
target of much derision because they refused to conform to dominant ideas and attitudes 
surrounding duty.  
The scholarly literature on conscription acknowledges the country's negative 
perceptions of the men called up under the NRMA, but the actual experience of the NRMA 
recruits has attracted relatively little attention.1 Yet, an inquiry into the lives of Canada's 
conscripts in the 1940s is important for several reasons. While both civilian and military 
reactions tended towards broad explanations of the NRMA recruits drawing upon ethnicity, 
                                                 
1 The notable exception is Daniel Byers, Zombie Army: The Canadian Army and Conscription in the 
Second World War (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 2016): 100-176. Byers examines 
contemporary statistics on the compulsory recruits at length and further details some of their experiences, 
although these notions form a small part of his larger inquiry into the NRMA. For an overview of Byers' 
argument, and how this thesis differs from his work, see the Introduction of the present study. 
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gender, loyalty, and patriotism, these ascriptions render an incomplete story.2 For inasmuch 
as these perspectives illuminate the attempt to explain the NRMA men, they do little to 
capture the experience of being a conscript during the Second World War.3 This approach to 
these men further helps to fill a significant gap in the historiography. Historians have tended 
to disregard the human element of Canadian conscription in favor of decisions made at the 
highest level of politics.4 Equally important, the compulsory recruits' responses to 
conscription were far more complex than historians generally have recognized, and, in 
particular, the dynamic was not a simple case of English-Canadian imperialism cast against 
French-Canadian nationalism.5 In fact, the experiences and perspectives of NRMA recruits 
are important in their own right for offering insight into evolving relationships between 
Canadians and their government, ideas of appropriate wartime behaviour, and notions of 
voluntarism and duty in a democratic society.  
This chapter explores why NRMA personnel chose to stand apart from their 
compatriots during the Second World War. Although few conscripts documented their 
wartime experiences, the available primary source material does allow a reconstruction of 
some of their motivations and worldviews. While the conscripts' reasons for not volunteering 
were as varied as were the motivations that drove others to enlist, a close inspection of the 
evidence reveals several broad trends in the recruits' responses. First, and perhaps most 
expectedly, conscripts rejected military service for personal reasons, including those related 
                                                 
2 I borrow here language employed by Jonathan Swainger in his article on teenagers and community 
identity. See: Jonathan Swainger, "Teen Trouble and Community Identity in Post-Second World War Northern 
British Columbia," Journal of Canadian Studies 47, no. 2 (Spring 2013): 169. 
3 Ibid. 
4 For example, see: E.L.M. Burns, Manpower in the Canadian Army 1939-1945 (Toronto: Clarke, 
Irwin & Company, 1956); R. MacGregor Dawson, The Conscription Crisis of 1944 (Toronto: University of 
Toronto Press, 1961); and J.L. Granatstein, Conscription in the Second World War: A Study in Political 
Management (Toronto: The Ryerson Press, 1969). 
5 One prime example of this perspective appears in J.L. Granatstein and J.M. Hitsman, Broken 
Promises: A History of Conscription in Canada (Toronto: Copp Clark Pitman, 1985): viii. 
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to family ties, ethical and religious beliefs about war, and other personal circumstances. 
Quite simply, these men privileged their freedom of choice and their individual rights over 
any obligations to the state. Other NRMA recruits refused to 'go active' in protest of the 
treatment they received once they had been conscripted. Having been labeled 'Zombies,' 
excluded from social and community activities, and often threatened or physically assaulted, 
there were reasons why the recruits would be ill disposed to embracing volunteer service or 
the rhetoric of duty. NRMA personnel increasingly viewed military life with disdain owing 
to the coercive practices used to 'convert' conscripts to volunteers – including assigning 
menial duties and refusing leaves – which compulsory recruits viewed as punishments for 
their refusal to volunteer. Finally, these men also articulated something of a quid pro quo 
mindset rooted in politics. Canadians had increasingly been moving towards a 
reconsideration of their relationship to the government throughout the 1930s, and while duty 
had once been the driving force behind wartime enlistment, such expectations were under 
increasing scrutiny. Thus, a significant number wished to hold the government accountable 
by forcing it to implement conscription for overseas service rather than place undue pressure 
on individual men to fill the ranks on the front lines. Taken as a collective, the perspectives 
of Canada's compulsory recruits are intriguing. While they may not have the language to 
express it in such terms, these men articulated nuanced ideas about freedoms and rights, 
constructed their actions as a means to protest their treatment, and expressed concerns about 
the reciprocal responsibilities of a democratic government and its citizens. 
Canada's Conscripts in the Second World War  
Within four months of the passage of the NRMA in June 1940, men began receive 
call-up notices requiring them to undergo a complete medical examination before arriving at 
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one of 39 basic training centres across the nation.6 Over the next six weeks, NRMA recruits 
acquired the fundamentals of drilling, marching, discipline, military education, and weaponry 
training.7 As many recruits soon learned, the military regulated almost every aspect of their 
daily lives from the time they awoke in the morning to the time they retired at night. Army 
recruits were told how to dress and behave, when to eat and sleep, and were otherwise 
ordered to accept the distinctive hierarchy of authority and discipline that accompanied 
military service.8 Naturally, for some recruits, these strict controls were disconcerting; it was 
difficult to acclimate to the rigours and demands of the army, particularly for those who had 
not voluntarily made the choice to enter the armed forces in the first place.  
Upon completing 30 days' training, the NRMA recruit was despatched to the reserve 
unit nearest to his home and was then liable for recall in the event that his services were 
required.9 By February 1941, owing to charges that the training scheme was ineffective and 
costly, policy shifts dictated that conscripts proceed to advanced training centres upon 
completion of the basic training program, rather than returning home. The protracted service 
period, which now amounted to four months in the army, meant that they acquired the 
specific skills required to serve as infantrymen, artillerymen, signallers, and engineers.10 The 
military expected to release conscripts back to civilian life once advanced training was 
completed but, in the midst of the four-month training period, army planners extended the 
                                                 
6 "First Drafts for Home Defence Are Now Being Called," Cariboo Observer, 28 September 1940: 1; 
and Granatstein and Hitsman, Broken Promises: 146.  
7 As noted in Chapter Two, an overview of the basic training syllabus can be found in the following 
war diaries: Library and Archives Canada (hereafter LAC), Record Group (hereafter RG) 24, Volume 17290, 
War Diary of No. 131 Canadian Army (Basic) Training Centre (hereafter CA(B)TC), Camrose, 16 July 1940; 
LAC, RG 24, Volume 17200, War Diary of No. 41 CA(B)TC, Huntingdon, 1-2 September 1940; and LAC, RG 
24, Volume 17225, War Diary of No. 47 CA(B)TC, Valleyfield, 20 September 1940. Also see: Byers, Zombie 
Army: 62.  
8 Byers, Zombie Army: 144. 
9 Granatstein and Hitsman, Broken Promises: 145. 
10 Byers, Zombie Army: 81. 
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NRMA scheme once again in April 1941. Instead of receiving discharges after the advanced 
training period, conscripts who did not agree to serve overseas joined operational home 
defence units and were tasked with defending Canada's borders.11 These units were scattered 
across the country and rotated frequently as a matter of policy in order to adapt the training 
syllabus to a variety of terrains and conditions in which the conscripts might have to fight.12  
Despite the periodic change of scenery and intensive combat preparation, troops were 
often bored. Most soldiers found themselves assigned to defence posts that were located in 
small, remote, and often isolated communities.13 Although the men communicated with their 
families and friends by written correspondence, censors nonetheless intercepted and seized 
letters that discussed life in the military in any degree of detail.14 Moreover, a recruit's 
chances of returning home on furlough or a weekend pass declined as the distance from home 
increased. Conscripts whose first language was not English likely felt especially secluded 
because there was a chance that few or no local civilians or other ranks in the unit spoke their 
language or shared their culture.15 Complaints also surfaced that books and films were not 
widely available on army bases in languages other than English.16 Consequently, English-
speaking recruits tended to tolerate life in the army better than did soldiers from other 
                                                 
11 Granatstein and Hitsman, Broken Promises: 151. 
12 Reginald H. Roy, "From the Darker Side of Canadian Military History: Mutiny in the Mountains – 
the Terrace Incident," Canadian Defence Quarterly 6, no. 2 (Autumn 1976): 42. A sample of an adapted 
training syllabus can be found in LAC, RG 24, Volume 15291, War Diary of the Winnipeg Grenadiers, 16 
September 1942. 
13 Byers, Zombie Army: 155. 
14 For example, see: LAC, RG 24, Volume 80, HQS-1161-1-18, File 1, Letter from Camp Borden, 9 
July 1941.  
15 Byers, Zombie Army: 167.  
16 University of Victoria Special Collections, Accession (hereafter Acc) 1980-055, Box 1, Folder 2, 
22nd Field Regiment, R.C.A., "Unit Moral Reports," April 1943: 3. 
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backgrounds, but even among conscripts whose native tongue was English, only 57 per cent 
professed a liking for army life.17  
Of course, military service was not without its advantages. Perhaps most importantly, 
the recruits benefited from free health and dental care. For many, it was the first time that 
they enjoyed full and routine access to these services.18 Conscripts were also encouraged to 
participate in various athletics to aid their physical conditioning and to foster a sense of 
camaraderie among the men in the ranks. According to one officer, a large percentage of 
NRMA recruits knew "little or nothing of games or sports and have to be taught same," a 
statement that lends itself to the interpretation that army life brought about myriad new 
experiences for these men.19 In addition to organized sport, activities such as dances, 
concerts, films, and other shows helped to combat boredom and probably worked to broaden 
the conscripts' horizons.20 Time spent in the military also many enabled them to see 
unfamiliar corners of the country. For some, life in the military was not without its benefits 
and large numbers of compulsory recruits did choose to enlist as volunteers at the end of the 
                                                 
17 Directorate of History (hereafter DH), File 113.3R4003 (D1), Special Report 126, "General Attitudes 
of Other Ranks towards the Army," 6 September 1944. 
18 Byers, Zombie Army: 144. It is no accident that the Canadian welfare state was established during 
the Second World War. The federal government came to play an enormous role in all aspects of wartime 
society, and the NRMA is one example of this. Many compulsory recruits were in better health by the time they 
completed their training than they were before being called up. 
19 LAC, Manuscript Group (hereafter MG) 27, III, B11, Volume 50, "Macklin's (Brigadier) Report re 
recruiting in Pacific Command," Lieutenant-Colonel J. MacGregor, "Observation on Attitude of (H.D. 
Personnel) Going Active," 26 April 1944: 1. This observation was probably rooted in classism. Most working-
class Canadians had yet to be introduced to the notion of leisure owing to their class. Furthermore, one of the 
truisms of British military life was that one learned how to be a man on the playing fields of Eton. Games, 
complete with rules, hierarchy, respectful endeavour, and graceful conduct, were critically important 
components of being masculine. Thus, while the evidence suggests that this leisure time was a new enterprise to 
many, the statement itself underlined vital distinctions. 
20 The same probably held true for the civilian population, who had the opportunity to interact with 
soldiers from across the country. See: Mia Reimers, "The Glamour and the Horror: A Social History of Wartime 
Northwestern British Columbia, 1939-1945" (Master's Thesis, University of Northern British Columbia, March 
1999): 63-79. 
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training period.21 Still, others were not easily swayed, and more than 60 per cent of NRMA 
personnel chose to remain on home soil.  
For those men who declined to 'go active,' contemporary observers tended to 
conclude that they were French Canadians, members of other minority ethnic groups, or 
otherwise possessed a variety of undesirable characteristics in an effort to explain why they 
did not seem to share their fellow Canadians' sense of duty. These perceptions, and especially 
those rooted in ethnicity, were at odds with reality. According to historian Daniel Byers: "In 
many ways, including their ethnic and geographical origins, languages spoken, religious 
convictions, and even the occupations they had pursued before being called up for military 
training, NRMA recruits more closely mirrored the population at large than has previously 
been suggested."22 In effect, most conscripts were young and unmarried, much like the 
nation's volunteer forces overseas. The greater number self-identified as Christians. The vast 
majority of NRMA recruits had been farmers or unskilled laborers. There was a slightly 
higher chance that compulsory recruits had been resident in Quebec but, owing to provincial 
demographics and recruiting practices, this is expected. The second largest province by 
population, Quebec also boasted more unmarried men per capita aged 21 to 24 and 25 to 30 
than any other province and, owing to the dominant wartime image that conscripts simply 
must have been French Canadians, the government concentrated on recruiting in Quebec to a 
greater degree than elsewhere. Finally, recruits spoke a variety of languages including 
                                                 
21 By the war's end, men who had been called up under the NRMA but chose to volunteer for overseas 
service comprised ten per cent of the Canadian Army overseas. In certain instances, commanders of training 
camps reported that 100 per cent of troops called up for military training 'went active.' See: Byers, Zombie 
Army: 165; and "All Trainees at Cornwall Again 'Active Service,'" Ottawa Citizen, 13 August 1941: 11. 
22 Byers, Zombie Army: 126. For Byers' full analysis of this data, see: Zombie Army: 125-43; and "Les 
«zombies» du Canada: un portrait des conscrits canadiens et de leur expérience durant la Deuxième Guerre 
mondiale," Bulletin d'histoire politique 8, nos. 2-3 (hiver-printemps 2000): 184-204. 
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English and French and the proportions were consistent with national averages.23 In effect, 
the nation's compulsory recruits reflected the larger society from which they were drawn, but 
they clearly differed from their compatriots in their interpretation of duty.  
For the Love of Family and Conscience: Personal Reasons against Enlistment 
The decision to serve on the front lines was often fraught with considerations about 
one's ties to home and country, the circumstances of one's personal life, and one's beliefs 
about military service. To their officers, it was quite apparent that the "men seem[ed] to have 
personal reasons for not signing."24 From the outset of the compulsory training program, 
conscripts expressed various reasons why they would not volunteer to serve abroad, and 
these changed little throughout the war. According to a national survey, the NRMA men 
indicated that they preferred to avoid military service for financial, domestic, occupational, 
and health reasons, or because they had a general dislike for army life.25 While the greater 
number of Canadians believed that they were duty-bound to support the war effort at great 
personal risk, conscripts tended to privilege their personal needs and desires before those of 
the nation writ large. In light of the common association of military service with good 
citizenship, many Canadians viewed conscripts as selfish. By contrast, however, the 
compulsory recruits themselves seemed to possess a different understanding of the 
                                                 
23 Byers, Zombie Army: 126-43 and 281, note 4. As Byers notes, information about each conscript was 
collected upon his enrollment into the military. Army officers then compiled and tabulated the data to provide 
statistical information about the NRMA recruits writ large. These statistics are part of a collection of 
unprocessed material from the army's Directorate of Records, but they have yet to be formally accessioned or 
catalogued.  
24 LAC, MG 27, III, B11, Volume 50, "Macklin's (Brigadier) Report re recruiting in Pacific 
Command," Lieutenant-Colonel L.J. St.-Laurent, "Enrolling NRMA. Personnel for Active Service in 1 Bn Le. 
Regiment de Hull C.A.," n.d. [May 1944]: 4; and Brigadier W.H.S. Macklin, "Mobilization of 13  Bde. on an 
Active Basis," 2 May 1944: 13. 
25 DH, File 113.3R4004 (D1), Report 101, "Attitudes of Depot-Recruits to Army Recruits," 3 January 
1944.  
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obligations of citizens in a democratic and liberal society, one that privileged individual 
rights and freedom of choice over unthinking obligation and unflinching commitment.  
Perhaps the most important personal reason why NRMA personnel chose to remain 
on the home front was rooted in familial obligation. Some men undoubtedly believed that 
their foremost duty was to their families at home, and that their duties as citizens came 
second. Despite one officer's sneering criticism, there was probably a degree of truth in his 
assertion that compulsory recruits refused to enlist because of their families: 
Some [conscripts] are passionately and strongly attached to women's apron strings… 
Their mothers, wives, or sweethearts have warned them that to sign active for 
overseas would break their hearts, endanger their faltering health, jeopardize their 
future – they would be through with them, etc. etc. Expectant mothers have warned 
against what might happen to the incubating child if the sirs should leave Canada. 
Mothers with sons overseas are loath to see another go.26  
 
Indeed, individual conscripts were apparently apt to claim, "I would go if my mother 
agrees."27 Another officer subscribed to similar thinking. "The pressure from outside sources 
to get men out of the army on leave is unending and unrelentless [sic], and has a continuously 
unsettling effect," he reported.28 Pressure from home was especially acute in those areas of 
Canada that voted 'no' in the April 1942 plebiscite on conscription by large majorities. Much 
of Quebec, as well as predominantly French-speaking Maritime communities and areas of the 
west with large concentrations of German- and Ukrainian-Canadian voters, all refused to 
release the government from its promises against overseas conscription.29 As historian J.L. 
                                                 
26 St.-Laurent, "Enrolling NRMA. Personnel for Active Service": 1-2. This same excerpt is quoted in 
Chapter Two, but given the different interpretive angle, it warranted inclusion here too. 
27 Queen's University Archives, F00630, Box 39, File 4, "General Staff Memoranda. October-
November 1944," Secretary to the Cabinet War Committee, "Report of Cabinet Committee on Army 
Enlistments for General Service, 6 November 1944: 5. 
28 Macklin, "Mobilization of 13 Bde. on an Active Basis": 11. 
29 J.L. Granatstein, "The 'Hard' Obligations of Citizenship: The Second World War in Canada," in 
William Kaplan, ed., Belonging: The Meaning and Future of Canadian Citizenship (Montreal and Kingston: 
McGill-Queen's University Press, 1993): 43; and Granatstein and Hitsman, Broken Promises: 169. 
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Granatstein argues, "That support at home…must have reinforced the reluctance of home-
defence conscripts from those communities to volunteer for overseas service."30 
In another report on the NRMA recruits, one officer believed that his men "want to 
follow home sentiment and feel they would be letting down those people who fought so hard 
to keep them in Canada."31 Across the country, the problem of family members discouraging 
voluntarism was widespread. Many conscripts apparently gave "the excuse their parents or 
wives will not give their consent" to send their sons or husbands abroad.32 Another officer 
likewise believed that, "family ties and home defence" were extolled "to encourage young 
men not to…fight."33 The war diarist for the Rocky Mountain Rangers recorded a similar 
instance of family influence. The commanding officer "had the experience… of interviewing 
the wives of two of his men in order to point out to them that it was their husband's [sic] duty 
to volunteer for General Service." The officer apparently "persuaded the wives," but it is 
unclear if their husbands agreed to attest as a general service volunteer once the matter was 
settled with their significant others.34 In any case, opinion among officers was near 
unanimous that it was "quite evident… that outside influence has a great…bearing" on many 
compulsory recruits' decision to stay on home soil.35 Of course, few people accepted these 
familial ties as a valid reason for refusing what many considered the most important of a 
citizen's obligations. The commanding officer of the Prince of Wales Rangers, for example, 
was forthright in his belief that, "There is no such thing as a family reason. The days are past 
when a married man should stay at home with his wife and family and let the single man do 
                                                 
30 Granatstein, "The 'Hard' Obligations": 43. 
31 St.-Laurent, "Enrolling NRMA. Personnel for Active Service": 2. 
32 MacGregor, "Observation on Attitude of (H.D. Personnel) Going Active": 1.  
33 LAC, MG 27, III, B11, Volume 50, "Macklin's (Brigadier) Report re recruiting in Pacific 
Command," Lieutenant-Colonel L.J. St. Laurent, "Subversive Societies – French Canadian NRMA Personnel.," 
29 April 1944: 1. 
34 LAC, RG 24, Volume 15205, War Diary of the Rocky Mountain Rangers, 14 April 1944. 
35 MacGregor, "Observation on Attitude of (H.D. Personnel)": 1. 
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the fighting. Family reason is a damn good reason why you should go Overseas [sic]. If you 
aren't ready to fight for your own wife and children how can you expect the single man to do 
it for you?"36 The question was pertinent, but for many conscripts, leaving their families 
behind to fight a distant war was simply not compelling.   
 Still other recruits felt that they would make unsuitable reinforcements for overseas. 
In one lengthy account, Private J. Adoranti explained under oath, "I have varicoseal [sic] 
which I had previous to joining the army. It did not trouble me much while a civilian, but 
found army trg was very painful." Initially posted to the Brockville Rifles, he visited the 
medical officer, reported his ailment, and explained that his condition pained him during 
route marches and battle drill training, but his concerns were brushed aside. Despite feeling 
that he "couldn't carry on" with his training, Adoranti was mobilized for the Aleutian Islands. 
There, while on combat duty, he recalled that his officers "threatened me with detention if I 
refused to march which I didn't, then I was called a sissy… I felt quite ashamed of myself 
time and time again when I could not follow the others." Several months later, his health 
concerns remained unaddressed in the new unit to which he was posted: 
[O]n one route march I felt the pain and couldn't keep up and was taken to the front of 
the column by vehicle. The Coy Comd [company commander] ordered me to keep up 
with the rest. I said I was doing my best. He took me by the sleeve and pulled me and 
tried to make me keep up with the rest. When he saw this failed he ordered a man to 
fix bayonet and get behind me and make sure I did keep up. I couldn't because of the 
pain… I haven't been given any medical treatment… If I appear hostile at any time its 
because of the manner in which I have been treated.37 
 
                                                 
36 LAC, RG 24, Volume 15150, War Diary of the Prince of Wales Rangers, Appendix 2, Address by 
Lt. Col. R.J. Bolton, 22 November 1944: 3. This excerpt is also quoted in Chapter Two, but the present chapter 
examines it from a different angle and it thus warranted inclusion here. 
37 LAC, RG 24, Volume 2655, HQS-35-45, File 7, "Proceedings of a Court of Inquiry assembled at 
Vernon, BC," 27 November 1944: 32-33.  
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Military administrators acknowledged the poor state of health of many of the men called up 
under the NRMA.38 Nevertheless, those unsuitable for operations often remained in the home 
defence army and were subject to appeals to volunteer for front-line service. It is not 
surprising that they declined. 
For other recruits, deeply held personal or religious beliefs contributed to the decision 
to refuse front-line service. As Thomas Socknat writes in his seminal study of pacifism in 
Canada, the question of conscription, and especially conscription for overseas, was important 
and even threatening for some because it exposed the vulnerability of individual conscience 
and forced pacifists to declare their personal opposition to the nation's war effort.39 
Furthermore, conscientious objection is at the core of an individual's relationship to the state 
because it challenges what many considered the most basic of civic obligations – the duty to 
defend one's country.40 Owing to the experience of conscription and conscientious objection 
in the Great War, provisions were made early in the Second World War for objectors to 
undertake work of national importance under civilian direction, resulting in a flexible system 
that enabled young men to postpone compulsory military service for either a set period or the 
duration of the war.41 According to Heather T. Frazer and John O'Sullivan, the least 
cooperative of conscientious objectors (COs) might be jailed, those who offered limited 
cooperation were employed in public works, while "the most cooperative [were] put into 
                                                 
38 For example, see various instructions and correspondence contained in: LAC, MG 27, III, B11, 
Volume 68, "Compulsory Training – NRMA 1942," and Volume 76, "Strengths, Shortages, Reserves, Statistics, 
Medical Cases 1943." 
39 Thomas Socknat, Witness Against War: Pacifism in Canada 1900-1945 (Toronto: University of 
Toronto Press, 1987): 225. 
40 Charles C. Moskos and John Whiteclay Chambers III, eds., The New Conscientious Objection: From 
Sacred to Secular Resistance (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1982): 1. 
41 Amy J. Shaw, Crisis of Conscience: Conscientious Objection in Canada during the First World War 
(Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 2009): 39. 
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uniform."42 Thus, despite accommodations for conscience, more than 700 of the 12,000 men 
classified as COs entered the armed forces, the majority under the NRMA.43 Still others 
probably characterized themselves as pacifists even if they were not recognized as bona fide 
conscientious objectors. While little is known about these men, matters of conscience 
motivated their actions and thus, they privileged their individual sense of religious and 
ethical objection to war. 
 Finally, the historiography on conscription provides additional insight into the 
recruits' reasons against volunteering. According to Granatstein, a recruit's ethnic origins may 
have had significant bearing on his willingness to serve overseas: 
For a Ukrainian, a Pole, a German, or an Italian, Britain's wars were not necessarily 
just, and rhetoric about the need to serve king and country…inevitably rang hollow… 
The almost automatic firing of foreign-born workers at the outbreak of war in 1914, 
the internment of citizens of Germany and Austria-Hungary, and the wholesale 
gerrymander of 1917, when the Wartime Elections Act stripped recently naturalized 
Canadians of the franchise all reinforced a natural tendency to keep to one's own 
kind.44 
 
Granatstein further argues that the nation did almost nothing to correct the misgivings of the 
Great War, suggesting that there were "no attempts worth recounting" to integrate those of 
origins other than British or French into Canada's life and values.45 The internment of 
naturalized and Canadian-born citizens of Japanese, German, and Italian heritage during the 
Second World War also did little to forge loyalties to the Canadian state, especially when 
combined with the discrimination that ethnic Canadians faced during the war.46 As the 
Wartime Information Board reported in 1943, complaints surfaced "that 'foreigners' are 
                                                 
42 Heather T. Frazer and John O'Sullivan, "We Have Just Begun to Not Fight": An Oral History of 
Consientious Objection in Civilian Public Service during World War II (New York: Twayne Publishers, 1996): 
vii.  
43 Socknat, Witness Against War: 255-6. 
44 Granatstein, "The 'Hard' Obligations of Citizenship": 39. 
45 Ibid: 40. 
46 Ibid: 42-44. 
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staying home and taking the jobs of 'real' Canadians who enlist… [They] have suffered years 
of humiliating discrimination because of their names, accents, or appearances… And until 
they feel like Canadians they can have little urge to fight for Canada."47 As Granatstein notes 
further, for many French Canadians, the wounds of the Great War and the ensuing 
conscription crisis of 1917 remained unhealed, and the points of departure between those 
who supported the defence of British ideals and conscription, and those who did not, 
remained unresolved when Canada went to war again.48 
A Form of Protest: Conscripts Respond to the Pressure to 'Go Active' 
While there were as many reasons against enlistment for front-line service as there 
were compulsory recruits, conscripts' experiences in the army provide additional clues why 
they refused overseas' service. For much of the war, the two categories of Canadian soldiers – 
conscripts and volunteers – drilled, marched, slept, ate, and otherwise lived alongside one 
another before the latter mobilized for service abroad. While instructing conscripts and 
volunteers conjointly made logistical and fiscal sense, the two categories of soldiers in close 
quarters gave rise to a number of problems. According to military historian Reginald H. Roy, 
the differences in attitude and outlook between conscripts and volunteers resulted in a far-
reaching morale problem that was unparalleled in Canadian military history.49 To voluntary 
recruits, many of whom enlisted out of a sense of duty to king and country, compulsory 
                                                 
47 Wartime Information Board, Information Briefs, Volume 6, "Low Morale,"19 April 1943, cited by 
William R. Young, "Chauvinism and Canadianism: Canadian Ethnic Groups and the Failure of Wartime 
Information," in On Guard for Thee: War, Ethnicity, and the Canadian State, 1939-1945, edited by Norman 
Hiller, Bohdan Kordan, and Lubomyr Luciuk (Ottawa: Canadian Committee for the History of the Second 
World War, 1988): 43. Also see: Jody Perrun, The Patriotic Consensus: Unity, Morale, and the Second World 
War in Winnipeg (Winnipeg: University of Manitoba Press, 2014): 26.  
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recruits failed to adhere to the responsibilities of citizenship, as evidenced by their NRMA 
status. As one officer reported: 
[T]he active personnel mentally ranged themselves in a body on one side and the 
N.R.M.A. ranged themselves on the other, and the gulf between them widened and 
deepened daily… It is not too much to say that the volunteer soldier in many cases 
literally despises the N.R.M.A. soldier…The volunteer feels himself a man quite apart 
from the N.R.M.A. man. He regards himself as a free man who had the courage to 
make a decision. He seldom takes the trouble to analyze the manifold reasons put 
forward by those who won't enlist. He lumps them all together as no more than feeble 
excuses masking cowardice, selfishness and bad citizenship. In many cases no doubt 
he is right.50 
 
Furthermore, the same officer also observed that, "the volunteer regards himself as above, 
and apart from the NRMA soldier. Nothing the latter does or can do by way of physical 
courage or superior intellect can alter this fact. It might be likened to the scorn of the white 
man (even the 'poor white') for the educated negro. He may be educated but he is still a 
nigger.'"51 In a prime example of white privilege and the normativity of English-Canadian 
beliefs and values, the implication was that those who were not ready to fight, regardless of 
the reason why, were of no more use to the nation than were people of color. Viewed in this 
sense, the conscripts' refusal to 'go active' is hardly surprising.  
Ralph Allen, a well-known war correspondent, described some of this discrimination 
in his popular history of the war years: 
Inevitably and quickly the existence of two such armies side by side led to frictions 
and differences of the ugliest kind. In their training camps it was… deliberate 
policy…to mix the R Men [conscripts] and A Men [volunteers] in fairly close ratios 
and hope that by moral pressure and sometimes by actual physical violence the A 
Men would help persuade the R Men to "go active" too. Between the two groups there 
were small distinctions in such things as cap badges and service ribbons and quite 
often larger ones in their treatment…Officially there was no discrimination against 
the R Men and none has ever been officially admitted… [but] the present writer can 
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testify from his own experiences that there was. So can thousands of other ex-
servicemen.52 
 
Allen described further the verbal, emotional, and physical abuse that conscripts experienced 
at the hands of voluntary recruits in two of his postwar novels, Home Made Banners and The 
High White Forest. Based on observations the author made while reporting for the Globe and 
Mail, these fictional accounts revolve around the inequitable treatment that conscripts 
received during training, as well as the types of pressures they faced from their officers to 
volunteer for front-line service.53 Others similarly detail the hostility that NRMA personnel 
faced. Barry Broadfoot provided several anecdotal accounts in Six War Years, 1939-1945: 
Memories of Canadians at Home and Abroad that affirm that army life could be a miserable 
experience for many conscripts. One of Broadfoot's interviewees recalled that at least one 
incoming draft of men into the unit were: 
a bunch of Zombies… Some French Canadians, but a lot of Ukrainians, and what-
have-you from towns and places in Manitoba and Saskatchewan… They didn't have 
to enlist for overseas service. Just to defend Canada… Our C.O. [commanding 
officer]… he told us to run the asses off them if we wanted… We called it P.T., 
physical training…We decided these Zombies better start the day right. Most of them 
were cow milkers [sic] anyway… Christ almighty, when I think of it, there was no 
gymnasium, no drill hangar, and here's these Zombies running through the streets of 
this town at 6:30 in the morning and it would often be 20 below. Hell, even colder. 
And in gymwear [sic] too! I think we froze them so silly they couldn't get going for 
the rest of the day, but anyway, they knew they were in the army, and they knew they 
were N.R.M.A. crud because the regular troops didn't get this treatment. Sure, sure, 
oh sure, you're darned right it was a form of punishment. The C.O. sure meant it to 
be, and we did too. I always figured if they were in this man's army, whether they 
wanted to be or not, they would damn well act like soldiers. It toughened 'em up 
anyway, although I'm not sure it got any of them to go active service.54 
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Conn Smythe, best known for forming and owning the Toronto Maple Leafs hockey team, 
preserved his own experiences with recruiting from within the ranks of the NRMA in his 
memoirs. Having risen through the ranks of the military in the First World Wars, Smythe 
went on to become a commanding officer in the 1939-1945 conflict. He recalled one instance 
in which his non-commissioned officers (NCOs) subjected NRMA recruits to cold showers 
for hours on end until they agreed to 'convert' to voluntary status.55  
Such instances of abuse are also readily available from the compulsory recruits' 
perspective. In September 1941, two NRMA recruits at the Cornwall, Ontario training camp 
submitted formal affidavits alleging that their general service compatriots verbally threatened 
them in front of witnesses and NCOs before the situation escalated to physical blows. Private 
Joseph Robert Miville claimed that he was "beaten to the point of becoming unconscious" 
before awaking in the camp's military hospital. He asserted further that NRMA recruits were 
subjected to "all sorts of vexations, reprimands, [and] harsh punishments, all inflicted without 
any reason or right and solely with a view to putting pressure" on compulsory recruits in 
order to make them "enlist…in the Active Force."56 Private J. Albert Lefebvre, the other 
conscript who submitted a formal complaint, alleged that his officers refused to grant him a 
pass to leave the training camp unless he agreed, "to use my holiday to try and induce my 
wife to assent to my voluntary enlistment."57 The Department of National Defence launched 
an inquiry, but by the time of the investigation, Miville and Lefebvre retracted their 
statements and refused to discuss the issue further.58 As Byers suggests, "Without more 
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information, it is difficult to tell whether this was due to a lack of truthfulness in the claims, 
or pressures put on the men to drop them."59 Of course, in light of the numerous sources that 
document forms of malignant treatment, it defies belief that the greater number of NRMA 
troops did not suffer abuse at the hands of their officers and general service colleagues.  
Viewed with disdain and tormented for much of the war, conscripts also had to 
contend with intense pressure from their officers to 'go active' or 'convert' into volunteers 
willing to make the ultimate sacrifice. In the words of the commander of one training centre: 
[O]ccasionally strong methods are sometimes used… Active and Reserve recruits are 
placed in the same platoons for training, and it is the desire that these platoons 
become 100% Active… Naturally when there are only one or two men left in a 
platoon who are still 'R,' they are bound to be a bit unpopular while they remain so. 
This sort of thing is of course discouraged as much as possible, but in spite of orders 
in this regard, incidents do occur.60 
 
The details of such incidents were not included in the report, but according to one NRMA 
recruit at Camp Borden: 
The Commanding Officer has openly boasted that he intends to make it as tough as 
possible for those who do not intend to join… Today we were given a chance to again 
signify what branch of the service we wished to entered [sic]. Those who did not 
volunteer were taken on a route march without equipment and also without our water 
bottles. This is in line with their policy of tough stud… I don't mind going away [to 
an operational home defence unit] but the thing that makes me so mad is the 'Shit' that 
we will have to take between now and the time we are supposed to leave… So far 
they have got about a third of the Company. I haven't done anything yet and I am at 
my wits end. God only know [sic] how long the rest of the gang can hold out.61 
 
As detailed in Chapter Two, officers were concerned with promoting good citizenship and 
the responsibilities that it encompassed – not the least of which was military service – but 
without any sense of their own hypocrisy, they were willing to use any tactics at their 
disposal to find reinforcements from within the ranks of the NRMA. 
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As the war dragged on and civilian enlistment began to wane, the drive to obtain 
volunteers from the ranks of the NRMA increased in vigor. By the spring of 1943, the 
number of troops stationed in the westernmost province had reached nearly 60,000.62 Of this 
number, men called out under the NRMA accounted for 63 per cent of soldiers in the 
province, and in some units, compulsory recruits comprised as much as 95 per cent of a unit's 
strength.63 As the Allies advanced in the Pacific, the possibility of attack on Canada abated 
and military planners moved to disband one of the divisions in British Columbia. The 
reinforcement stream absorbed the majority of voluntary recruits in the province and 
exacerbated the divisions between volunteers and conscripts in the province. 64 In the ranks 
of the Prince Edward Island Highlanders, for example, there were only six volunteers, while 
Les Fusiliers du Saint-Laurent boasted only three general service men.65 It would be 
reasonable to assume that efforts to attest conscripts to general service were particularly acute 
in the province because of the large numbers of NRMA men in the ranks there. As Peter A. 
Russell writes, there had been an ongoing campaign to persuade or pressure home defence 
(HD) men to go active, but it "reached an entirely new level of intensity" in the spring of 
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1944.66 In one incident, officers "had reduced more than one man to tears… [while] 
persuading the man to enlist," during the campaign.67 
 Across the province, the military attempted to 'convert' as many conscripted soldiers 
as possible and promised that these men would transfer to Europe as a unit. Major-General 
Pearkes, commander of the military's westernmost formation in Canada, selected Vernon's 
13th Infantry Brigade as the unit that would proceed to the front lines.68 Any troops who 
'converted' thus transferred to Vernon Military Camp before heading to Debert, Nova Scotia 
to board ships for the European theatre. As part of their efforts to bolster the brigade's ranks, 
numerous recipients of the Victoria Cross, the British Commonwealth's highest decoration 
for valor, traveled to British Columbia's military camps to urge men to volunteer. Unit 
commanders further lectured their men on the importance of voluntarism and they conducted 
one-on-one interviews to encourage 'conversions.'69 In one report on the campaign, an officer 
candidly described how "officers [were] obliged to use every sort of cajolery, argument and 
promise, to induce their men to enroll."70 In some instances, monetary incentives and small 
prizes were offered to those men who agreed to volunteer to serve abroad.71 
 While enduring various forms of pressure to volunteer, the men who resisted these 
demands had to contend with certain consequences of the recruiting campaign. With the 
influx of newly attested general service troops in Vernon, the remaining conscripts in the 13th 
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Brigade who refused to volunteer were routinely transferred out of their barracks and into a 
nearby tent camp christened "Tentville" or "Zombeeville [sic]" by officers and other general 
service soldiers.72 Major-General Pearkes described the conditions at the camp as "quite 
comfortable," and noted that the "Weather was not cold[,] beds were provided and exactly the 
same rations [were] issued as for volunteers."73 One war diarist, however, refuted any notion 
of comfort: "The overflow tent camp is very muddy and with floorless, lightless and heatless 
tents the conditions are not good."74 Furthermore, while the brigade's voluntary recruits 
participated in a Victory Loan parade, the unit's NRMA men received orders to proceed on a 
15-mile march out of town.75 Several conscripts experienced reductions in rank in order to 
fill their positions with volunteers, and compulsory recruits were further routinely denied 
access to medical and dental care in order to inoculate and otherwise prepare their colleagues 
for the overseas draft.76 Volunteers also received preference over conscripts when it came to 
issuing passes to leave the camp.77 Finally, once the brigade vacated Vernon, the men who 
did not attest as volunteers were relocated to other units across the province.78 Several weeks 
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after receiving transfers, some NRMA men complained that they were made "to live like 
savages for five weeks in the woods of Courtenay," before being shipped to a remote 
northern community for the winter. At that time, the unit in question was completing a 
routine bivouac training exercise, but the recent transfers believed that the hard training and 
isolation was punishment for their refusal to join the 13th Infantry Brigade in battle.79 There 
was an easy explanation for these circumstances: the necessity of housing incoming recruits, 
preparing them for overseas, and allowing them to spend time with their families or to enjoy 
the local sites before heading to the front lines. In addition, the unit at Courtenay was already 
engaged in their training when they received the incoming draft of men from Vernon.80 
Nevertheless, the military's lack of communication fostered animosity among the NRMA 
men. Their bitter resentment towards the army during the recruiting campaign was the final 
affront for many of the NRMA troops.81 
Owing to the predominantly negative attitudes towards conscripts and their 
deplorable experiences in training camps, many recruits became increasingly steadfast in 
their refusal to volunteer regardless of circumstances. One senior officer witnessed the 
resentment among NRMA troops that "grew out of treatment received" and "by being mixed 
with the Active Force." His troops reported that they "were greeted with such phrases as 
'yellow bastards' when the country hoped…that they would go Active."82 Indeed, one self-
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proclaimed 'Zombie' alluded to as much. "You'll never know the harassment we underwent," 
he recalled. "I was a Zombie…I was a marked man… Shit and slops for four years, and every 
time I got slapped in the face with a wet fish it strengthened my resolve."83 Likewise, in one 
brigade, the NRMA personnel were "determined never to sign active in protest against the 
repeated attempts to have them sign, against the taunts and jibes suffered over the years from 
Active personnel and the public who classified them as 'Zombies,' 'Westypoofs,' 'Conscripts,' 
'Women's Home Companions,' 'Pantywaists,' 'Poltroops,' 'The Lily Livered,' and other 
unmentionables."84 After enduring unrelenting mental, emotional, and in some cases, 
physical abuse, combined with coercive army recruiting practices, many NRMA men became 
firm in their stance against enlistment for overseas, no matter the circumstances. After all, 
having endured "a lot of bad feeling and unnecessary trouble," why should they risk their 
lives for a nation that viewed them with contempt and "treated [them] like scum"?85 
Renegotiating Relationships: The Politicization of Compulsory Recruits 
The final reason why many NRMA recruits refused to enlist was rooted in politics. 
Inasmuch as the government expected that all Canadians unite behind the war effort, many 
compulsory recruits felt unnerved at the prospect of making the ultimate sacrifice for a nation 
that had failed them in the 1930s but that nonetheless expected them to fight on the front 
lines. At the centre of such thinking was the articulation of an 'eye for an eye' mindset that 
left many conscripts to wonder what the Canadian state had done for them that bound them to 
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overseas service. In articulating such notions, the conscripts' refusal to enlist was part of a 
broader trend interconnected with the rise of welfare-state thinking.86 Thus, as the nation's 
conscripts demonstrate, Canadians were moving towards a reconsideration of their 
relationship to the state. To the degree that duty had compelled thousands of young men to 
'don the khaki,' others increasingly expressed the notion that this open-ended expectation was 
unsustainable. 
The bitter experience of having lived through the Great Depression led many to refuse 
to volunteer for a government that offered little aid when the public had been desperate and 
starving. The Second World War provided the first sustained economic growth in the country 
for at least a decade. More importantly, many individuals, some for the first times in their 
lives, were able to secure employment and work for high wages as the economy shifted into 
wartime production. Yet, almost as soon as the nation reached full employment, they began 
to receive call-up notices under the NRMA, and their military training tore them away from 
long sought-after employment opportunities. In the words of one conscript in an anonymous 
letter sent to the Minister of National Defence: "I was attending high school when the 
'depression' came... My father had to resort to 'menial jobs,' mother to 'scrubbing and 
washing'. The meagre income thus derived necessitated careful budgeting and self-sacrifice 
that I might continue to graduation." Following graduation, with "Diplomas [sic] in hand, 
eager to learn, willing to work, I set out seeking employment." Finding few opportunities and 
quickly becoming "ragged and hungry," the young man "rode the rods, worked in relief 
camps at $5.00 a month [and] had just got a job when war broke out." Despite his recent 
employment gains, the anonymous recruit, like many other young men, eventually received 
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the call to arms under the NRMA. These men fulfilled their legal obligations to the country 
by answering their call-up notices, but few felt obliged to exceed these duties by volunteering 
for service overseas.87 As one company commander explained, "When asked why they are 
not GS, they state that they do not owe the country anything, that during the 'Depression 
Years' the country didn't care whether they were alive or dead, but now it is at war, they are 
wanted. When it is pointed out that there are plenty of men overseas who were just as badly 
off as they were, they merely state: 'If they want to be suckers, we aren't.'"88 Thus, for those 
men who believed that the government reneged on its responsibility to provide adequate 
relief and care for its citizens in their time and need, they also believed that these 
circumstances absolved them from their duty to aid the government in its darkest hour. Here, 
in the responses of conscripts, we see hints that Canadians were beginning to rethink the 
reciprocal responsibilities of a government and its citizens. 
Across the country, compulsory recruits seemed to have "enthrisasm [sic] for work, 
but there [sic] interest is in returning to civil life. They say 'Why go over now? – [We] want 
to get back to our jobs.'"89 Manpower shortages on the home front meant that the Department 
of Agriculture urged the army to release soldiers temporarily for seeding, harvesting, logging, 
and factory work, even while the Department of National Defence's prioritized the 
'conversion' of conscripts to volunteers.90 "Time and again," recalled the General Officer 
Commanding-in-Chief of Pacific Command: 
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the Deputy Minister of Agriculture would ring me up [and say] 'we've got to have 
more men released; we've got to get this crop in.' Some men went practically for the 
whole summer. They went home for seeding, they stayed for haying and they were 
again granted leave for harvesting… And these men never did get trained and they 
formed the hard core of the resistance movement against volunteering.91 
 
The relative ease with which the NRMA soldier could obtain farm leave – accompanied by 
additional wages and a taste of civilian freedom – resulted in bitter resentment towards the 
military, the government, and conscription policy because, had they not been called up, 
conscripts could be working for lucrative wages.92 According to another officer, because 
army leave was easily obtainable, the conscript became convinced "that he is not really 
needed for the defence of Canada. He blames his Commending [sic] Officer, his Brigadier 
and his G.O.C. [General Officer Commanding] and 'The Army' for refusing to let him go… I 
am absolutely convinced," he continued, "that thousands of NRMA soldiers will resolutely 
decline to enlist as long as the prospect of farm or other leave is dangled before them like a 
carrot before a donkey."93  
Fostering further resentment among NRMA recruits was the fact that conscription 
was unevenly imposed. Invariably, men working in essential industry could defer their 
compulsory military training owing to their employment. Yet, thousands of other men, all 
eligible for service, escaped the draft completely. In 1943, the army reported that it was over 
20,000 men short of its needs in NRMA men, all while 115,000 single men and 160,000 
married men employed in low-priority industries had not received call-up notices.94 In a 
democratic society, conscription policy aimed to ensure equality of sacrifice, but in practice 
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and from the conscripts' perspective, the NRMA forced some men into uniform but 
overlooked others, the latter of whom continued to earn high wages working in nonessential 
industries. Thus, when conscripts were able to obtain leave, they despised seeing other men 
"working unmolested for high wages."95 In light of the evidence, it comes as little surprise 
that some 6,300 conscripts out of 15,600 had unlawfully deserted their posts to return to 
civilian life in late 1944 alone.96 In the words of Private D.E. Laracque, a conscript serving in 
the ranks of Les Fusiliers du Saint-Laurent, "I have been in the army for four years, and been 
gypped all that time and it won't happen to me anymore."97 The inherent inequality was 
simply too much to overcome. Far from the image of the mindless, unthinking 'Zombie,' the 
evidence suggests that conscripts were expressing far more sophisticated critique than is 
generally attributed to them. 
Related to one's relationship to the state, other home defence troops were firm in their 
stance that a democratic government ought to be transparent in its policies, honest in their 
execution, and accountable for any consequences. As one NRMA recruit recalled, the men 
compelled into uniform had, "honestly tried to abide by the laws of this country," by 
answering their call-up notices, completing the compulsory training program, and serving on 
home soil in defensive units.98 Yet, while they had complied with the law, these men were 
subjected to undue pressure from their military commanders, general service colleagues, and 
the civilian population to exceed their ascribed wartime duty. Many NRMA personnel thus 
refused to 'go active' on principle; to volunteer would allow the government to escape the 
                                                 
95 Macklin, "Mobilization of 13 Bde. on an Active Basis": 11. 
96 "The Shocking Truth," Globe and Mail, 22 January 1945: 6. 
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'spectre of conscription' and its repercussions while, in equal measure, would hold the 
government accountable to its extensive promises against compulsion for overseas service.  
At the same time, while many NRMA recruits seemed genuine in their view of 
government accountability, we must allow for alternate interpretations of the evidence. As 
Roy argues: 
a great many [of conscripted men] claimed that if the government wanted or needed 
them, it would conscript them for overseas service. Since Prime Minister W.L. 
Mackenzie King had repeatedly declared that his government would not impose 
conscription for overseas service, it was a refrain which the conscripts could use as a 
shield to their own personal motives for avoiding service overseas.99 
 
Indeed, in Le Régiment de Hull, the commanding officer believed that at least some of his 
troops were "willing to gamble on being conscripted for overseas service and will bide their 
time" serving in defensive roles.100 In all likelihood, both possibilities were realized; some 
conscripts were politically progressive in their views, and others latched onto excuses rooted 
in politics in order to avoid being sent overseas. In both instances, though, conscripts 
apparently took pride in the fact that they "have beaten 'the army' [and] they have beaten 'the 
government,'" in refusing to volunteer.101  
At the same time, the majority of conscripted men were ostensibly willing to serve 
overseas, but only if the government ordered them to do so. As reported by Major-General 
Pearkes, the troops under his command frequently claimed, "We will hang back and wait 
until the Government tells us," or "If the Government tells us to go, we will go."102 In the 
Rocky Mountain Rangers, "The opinion most generally expressed" by the NRMA personnel 
                                                 
99 Roy, "From the Darker Side": 43-44. 
100 St.-Laurent, "Enrolling NRMA. Personnel for Active Service": 3. 
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was "that it is up to the Govt. to make the decision."103 Brigadier Macklin, the commanding 
officer of the 13th Infantry Brigade, observed this sentiment in his unit as well: "As they say 
themselves, they will go if they are sent."104 Macklin went on to suggest that his men, 
"honestly think that by holding out they will some day [sic] force the Government to adopt 
conscription which they feel is the only fair system."105 
To the degree that the system of coercing young men into 'going active' under the 
banner of voluntarism ensured a steady stream of reinforcements for overseas, the 
government was able to delay implementing conscription for overseas service and to avoid 
the historical unrest associated with compulsion. In the event that these men were needed 
overseas to win the war, the NRMA recruits wanted to ensure that the country's politicians 
had to answer to its citizens and deal with any repercussions related to conscription policy. In 
Le Régiment de Hull, "A large percentage of the NRMA personnel," were apparently 
"perfectly willing to serve their country anywhere but are firm in the stand that they should 
be ordered officially to go overseas."106 Likewise, "The big majority," of men stationed at 
British Columbia transit camp felt "that if the military authorities really wanted them they 
would order them Active."107 Many recruits therefore scoffed at the notion of front-line 
service because they felt that the country's war effort overseas should not rely on "handcuffed 
volunteers," a term used to describe the so-called voluntary recruiting system from within the 
ranks of the NRMA.108 
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Quite apart from contemporary perceptions of 'Zombies,' the troops compelled to 
arms were not mindless or unthinking creatures, but instead expressed nuanced ideas about 
governmental accountability and the democratic notion of equality in their stance on 
conscription. As detailed in Captain R.R. Sanger's report on the NRMA, the men had a 
number of questions about the government's policy on conscription: 
Why if the situation in Europe is so critical at the present time does not the Govt. 
bring in conscription when it is empowered to do so by the plebescite [sic] taken a 
short time ago… Why should the H.D. receive the brunt of Govt. criticism and be 
used as a political football while there are thousands of able-bodied civilians 
wandering the streets, who come under the same category but so far have escaped the 
draft? Why did the Govt. not bring in Conscription after the plebiscite? Was it 
because the Govt. deemed it necessary to handle Quebec with kid gloves to insure 
[sic] the Liberal Party of the backing of the Quebec population, as it is the only 
Province in Canada opposing conscription…109 
 
Likewise, troops stationed elsewhere reportedly directed similar questions to their officers. 
"Why does the Govt. not exercise its powers of conscription…Why, when there is such a 
labour shortage are so many men putting in their time in uniform travelling around the west 
coast when there is no apparent need for such a large force there… If the Govt. doesn't see fit 
to carry out a policy that is fair to all concerned, why should we go and fight for those who 
are staying at home and making good money and having a good time?"110 By the time these 
reports were penned in late 1944, compulsory recruits had been subjected to various 
pressures to volunteer for the front lines for more than three years. Much of the rhetoric used 
by the army to attest men to volunteer status centred on the apparent necessity of overseas 
reinforcements, and that it was their duty as Canadian citizens to wage war on the front 
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lines.111 In the men’s minds, if their services were required for the European theatre as badly 
as their officers assured them they were, the responsibility to conscript rested on the 
government. As the men pointed out, the country's favourable reaction to the plebiscite 
earlier in the war authorized overseas conscription.112 By foregoing compulsion for abroad, 
the government created an environment that fostered unease, misinformation, and distrust 
within the ranks, as well as a general loss of faith in the military and in its officers. That few 
historians acknowledge that the so-called 'Zombies' were politically aware and even 
sophisticated in their views of government accountability is one of the most puzzling 
anomalies in the historiography. 
Conclusion: Rendering a Human Aspect of Conscription 
Many scholars view wars as exercises in nation building.113 This is especially true of 
the Great War through the narrative of colony-to-nation, owing to Canada's seat on the 
League of Nations, its signature on the Treaty of Versailles, and greater Canadian 
independence under the Statute of Westminster. In the same way, the Second World War 
gave rise to the 'rights revolution' in Canada and opened the dialogue on the meaning of 
Canadian citizenship.114 For those men compelled to serve under the National Resources 
Mobilization Act, by asserting their right not to serve in the military, these men were part of 
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an important transformation in the discourse of citizenship and the nation-building process.115 
That these men stood apart from their compatriots in their understanding of duty makes them 
an important study in the evolution of rights and responsibilities in Canada. 
As we have seen, many Canadians expressed concern over the vast numbers of home 
defence conscripts who refused to conform to contemporary understanding of wartime duty. 
Contemporary opinion held that the men called up under the National Resources 
Mobilization Act were undemocratic, unpatriotic, and they simply must have been French 
Canadians or other ethnic minorities because they did not seem to possess proper Anglo-
Saxon values. Certainly, the nation's conscripts refused to conform to popular expectations 
surrounding civic responsibility, but not for the reasons that many contemporaries believed. 
While there is little evidence to support the notion that all conscripts responded universally to 
the suggestion that they 'go active' and serve on the front lines, there are several broad trends 
in the responses of these men. 
Indeed, their reactions to conscription policy and to coercive recruiting practices were 
legacies of the interwar years and in their experiences in the army once they joined the ranks 
of the NRMA. For some, the government had failed them during the Depression, and further 
reneged on its promises against overseas conscription, thus absolving conscripts from their 
responsibilities to fight for king and country. The possibility that the government might avoid 
the consequences of implementing overseas conscription by coercing young men to 'go 
active' was also the cause for some concern. For others, family ties and personal beliefs came 
before any kind of civic obligations. Still other conscripts refused to enlist in the overseas 
army because they felt that they were victims of discrimination because of their ethnicity, or 
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because they were 'treated like scum' during military training and service at the hands of 
officers and other uniformed men. A sustained inquiry into the motivations of Canada's 
conscripts is important because it undermines contemporary perceptions of 'Zombie' 
conscripts, and because it further serves to suggest that the nation's conscripts were quite 
sophisticated in their understanding of individual rights, political responsibility, and the 
reciprocal relationship of a democratic government and its citizens. 
128 
 
Conclusion: 
Conscription and Identity in Second World War Canada 
 
The vision and courage of men and women have transformed our country – 
almost within living memory – from small and virtually unknown regions of 
forest and farm into one of the great industrial nations of the world. But far 
more than material growth has arisen from the vision and courage of our 
people; they have also sought to continuously to defend and to extend the 
frontiers of freedom. More than once in the name of Canada, the sons and 
daughters of Canada have valiantly served; and thousands have died to save 
the world's freedom. In world affairs, our country has an outstanding record of 
responsibility and integrity.1 
– William Lyon Mackenzie King  
Speech at the Supreme Court of Canada on Canadian Citizenship 
3 January 1947 
 
Two days after the Canadian Citizenship Act of 1946 came into effect, Prime 
Minister William Lyon Mackenzie King and 25 others – among them a farmer, a shoemaker, 
and a metallurgical engineer – received Canadian citizenship. Although the status of being a 
Canadian citizen had existed for more than three decades, only after the Second World War 
did citizenship become distinct and separate from British nationality.2 The war was an 
integral part of that transformation of citizenship and of identity, and the emphasis that King 
placed on the conflict's transformative powers, and on the courage of the nation's sons and 
daughters in taking up arms, is hard to ignore. The war had confirmed Canada as a sovereign 
nation, and many wanted the rest of the world to recognize the country's recently won status.3  
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It was this climate of identity, citizenship, and nation building that has informed this 
thesis. When newspapers reported on NRMA recruits, they were not merely reporting 'facts' 
but were also providing insight into how Canadians envisaged their nation, or contested that 
vision. The 'Zombie' ascription reveals the degree to which Canadians were unsettled by the 
prospective that touchstones of Anglo-Canadian life were coming under scrutiny – that duty 
was no longer obligatory,  and that some viewed what was once considered  deferential and 
honorable conduct with disdain. Likewise, as frustrated and disbelieving as were military 
officers with the conscripts under their command, their discourse reveals concerns that 
Canada lacked distinct symbols of its own nationhood as it slowly distanced itself from the 
badges, symbols, and identities of British imperialism. Furthermore, the perspectives of 
conscripts themselves also formed an integral part of this dialogue. An inquiry into the 
reasons why many compulsory recruits chose to stand apart from their compatriots in their 
vision of duty and government responsibility provides key insights into the stresses and 
nuances of the mid-century nation-building process.4 As such, this thesis argues that the 
identity, citizenship, and nation building feature prominently in the rhetoric surrounding 
conscription in the Second World War.  
 While this examination leaves many questions unanswered, it does provide a platform 
for further study. The notion of identity – whether that of the nation writ large or that of 
individual conscripts – is a lens through which British Columbia's 1944 anti-conscription 
demonstrations might be (re)interpreted. In addition, we might wonder about conscript-
volunteer tensions at training camps early in the war, or other 'Zombie' uprisings at Calgary, 
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Drummondville, Gravenhurst, Shilo, Debert, and other cities and military camps across 
Canada. While this thesis contributes to the extant historiography on conscription, there 
nevertheless remains a lacuna in the literature when it comes to understanding compulsory 
service 'on the ground.' This aspect deserves attention and analysis.  
Still, this thesis offers one of the first sustained attempts to move beyond the politics 
of conscription in the Second World War. The complex layers of meaning assigned to the 
'Zombies' reveals a wealth of knowledge about national identity. Through an examination of 
its social constructions, compulsory service is well suited as one avenue through which to 
glean contemporary ideas about Canada's sense of self, popular notions of the nature and 
responsibility of governments, and the reciprocal duties of its citizens. By linking identity 
discourse with an important social and politico-military issue, this study contributes to both a 
revisionist history of conscription outside of high-level politics as well as to our 
understanding of Canadian identity and citizenship in the mid-twentieth century. Historian 
and political scientist Alan C. Cairns contends that, "The debates surrounding the 
conscription crises of both world wars were citizenship controversies about the extent and 
nature of civic obligation," but as this thesis suggests, the evidence demonstrates that the 
debate also touched upon what it was to be Canadian.5 To dismiss contemporary ideas about 
and attitudes towards conscription is to do a disservice to those who argued both sincerely 
and viscerally about the kind of nation they desired and hoped to possess in the 1940s.  
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